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Gutman: An Empirical Reexamination

An Empirical Reexamination of State
Statutory Compensation for the Wrongly
Convicted
Jeffrey S. Gutman*

I. INTRODUCTION
An appropriate measure of a just society is how it treats those whom the
government harms most severely. As frequent and well-publicized exonerations have been etched into the public consciousness over the last several years,
a number of scholars have engaged in the study of compensation for such a
group – those wrongly convicted.1 The general tenor of the resulting articles
is one of disappointment.2
*

© Jeffrey S. Gutman 2016. Jeffrey S. Gutman is a Professor of Clinical Law at the
George Washington University Law School. I thank Dean Blake Morant for providing
me a summer research grant to write this Article. I further thank Adele Bernhard of
New York Law School and Professor Stacy Brustin of the Catholic University Law
School for their constructive comments. Professor Samuel Gross of the University of
Michigan Law School provided permission to use the data assembled by the National
Registry of Exonerations. Maurice Possley of the Registry is the source of a great deal
of my compensation data. I owe a debt of gratitude to research assistants Garrett Fitzgerald, Nicole Giles, Benjamin Gutman, William Pauley, and Natasha Sim. With great
admiration and respect, I acknowledge my clients Donald Gates, Kirk Odom, Santae
Tribble, and Cleveland Wright, whose wrongful convictions serve as the guiding narrative of this Article.
1. A word is in order on vocabulary. Throughout this Article, I use the term
“wrongly convicted” or “unjustly convicted” interchangeably. I use these terms to describe persons whose criminal convictions have been vacated or reversed, either because of a determination that the individual was factually innocent of the crime for
which he or she was convicted, or because of the disclosure of evidence consistent with
innocence. In this sense, these terms overlap with the definition of “exoneration” developed by the National Registry of Exonerations described infra note 128.
2. See Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 703 (2004) [hereinafter Bernhard, Justice Still Fails]; Justin Brooks &
Alexander Simpson, Find the Cost of Freedom: The State of Wrongful Conviction Compensation Statutes Across the Country and the Strange Legal Odyssey of Timothy Atkins, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 627 (2012); Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A
Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665 (2002);
Howard S. Master, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for Compensating the
Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 102 (2004). See also Michael
Leo Owens & Elizabeth Griffiths, Uneven Reparations for Wrongful Convictions: Examining the State Politics of Statutory Compensation Legislation, 75 ALB. L. REV.
1283, 1298 (2012) (“We must recognize, however, that the statutory victories in some
states to compensate the wrongly convicted are more hollow than they are solid, given
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The notion of compensating the wrongly convicted is hardly new; it was
pioneered by Professor Edwin Borchard over a century ago.3 In 1913, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a no-fault wrongful conviction compensation statute.4 There is a long-standing and near-universal understanding that,
with respect to the wrongly convicted, “[e]xcept when an innocent defendant
is executed, we hardly can conceive of a worse miscarriage of justice.”5 There
can be little dispute that the government has a corresponding moral responsibility to provide appropriate remedies to those individuals.6 Yet, 18 states still
lack no-fault compensation laws, and most of the remarkably dissimilar existing state laws share two characteristics in tension with that moral duty.

that the laws include weak provisions for the amount and quality of compensation.”).
Press and opinion pieces similarly criticize the inadequacy of state wrongful conviction
compensation statutes. See, e.g., Opinion, Paying for Years Lost Behind Bars, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2016, at A20; Karen Brown, Opinion, Life After Wrongful Conviction,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2016, at SR10; Jessica Pishko, Tim Atkins Was Wrongfully Imprisoned for 23 Years – Why Is California Denying Him Compensation?, NATION (Mar.
9, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/tim-atkins-was-wrongfully-imprisonedfor-31-years-why-is-california-denying-him-compensation/ (discussing the claim of
Timothy Atkins, a 2007 exoneree, featured in Brooks & Simpson, supra).
3. See Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of
Criminal Justice, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 706 (1912); Edwin M. Borchard,
State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 108, 110 (1914); EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) [hereinafter BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT]; Edwin
Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. REV. 201, 208
(1941). See also John H. Wigmore, The Bill to Make Compensation to Persons Erroneously Convicted of Crime, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665, 665–67 (1912).
4. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2017).
5. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2014).
6. For some, that moral duty is supported by the utilitarian notion that society as
a whole, which benefits from the operation of the criminal justice system, should bear
the cost when the operation of that system causes harm to the wrongly convicted. As
Professor Borchard put it, “Where the common interest is joined for a common end,
with each individual subject to the same danger [i.e., erroneous conviction], the loss,
when it occurs, should be borne by the community and not alone by the injured individual.” BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 3, at 390. Professor Bernhard makes the same point:
After all, it is the state, through operation of one of its most essential services –
the criminal justice system – that has inflicted the harm. Although it may be
impossible to hold any individual law enforcement officer, or any particular
municipality, liable, the state’s responsibility for the injury is sufficient to generate a moral obligation.

Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 93 (1999) [hereinafter Bernhard, When Justice Fails]. See
also John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “LibertyProperty,” 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 537 (2008); Master, supra note 2, at 110–17.
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First, there is a hypervigilant worry of compensating those who are
viewed as potentially undeserving. Many statutes, for instance, place on the
claimant the formidable burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that he or she is factually innocent7 and/or require the claimant to demonstrate
that he or she had engaged in no misconduct that caused his or her prosecution
or conviction.8 Second, and the issue addressed in this Article, most prescribe
astonishingly modest awards and/or impose caps on monetary compensation
that are far below those awarded by most juries and judges in recent federal
civil rights cases arising from wrongful convictions and in cases brought under
state compensation statutes without caps.9 Such statutes largely ignore the nature, severity, and variation of injuries suffered while incarcerated; fail to account for post-release damages, such as ongoing psychological and medical
harms; and overlook the pressing needs many exonerees have for social, vocational, medical, and educational services following what is often years of
wrongful incarceration. In sum, most of these statutes reflect a begrudging

7. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-101(1)(a) (West 2017); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-422(2) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(2) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:572.8(A)(2) (West 2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2) (2017); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 1(C) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
691.1755(1) (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4603 (West 2017); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2017); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(5)(c) (McKinney 2017); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(e)(2) (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3) (West
2017). Colorado’s statute, for example, permits payment only when the conviction is
set aside for “reasons other than legal insufficiency of evidence or legal error unrelated
to the petitioner’s actual innocence,” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-102(2)(a)(I), and
when the claimant shows actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Id. §§
13-16-101(1), 13-65-102(1). In Nelson v. Colorado, 2017 WL 1390727 (U.S. Apr. 19,
2017), a case dealing with Colorado’s procedures to obtain a refund of fines and penalties through its Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons statute when a conviction has been overturned, Justice Alito described the statute (which similarly governs
the process for obtaining compensation for wrongful conviction) as “harsh, inflexible,
and prevents most defendants whose convictions are reversed from demonstrating entitlement to a refund.” Id. at *11 (Alito, J., concurring).
8. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422(2) (requiring that the petitioner show that he did
not engage in misconduct causing his prosecution); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2702(d) (West 2017) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(d); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8b(5)(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10B (West 2017). But see HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§661B-3(b) (West 2017) (assigning certain cause or contribute disqualifying conditions
as affirmative defenses requiring proof by government by a preponderance of the evidence). Particular states have other similarly intended disqualifying quirks, such as a
requirement that the claimant receive a pardon from the governor (Maine, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Tennessee), that only DNA exonerees are eligible for compensation (Missouri and Montana), and that those convicted of a felony prior to the wrongful
conviction are ineligible (Florida).
9. By “prescribed award,” I mean a statute requiring a particular daily or annual
compensatory award, regardless of facts or circumstances. By a “cap,” I mean a ceiling
on a possible award, usually expressed as the maximum annual and/or total payout.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

372

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

rather than a restorative approach to remedying the harm done to the wrongly
convicted.
Despite all this, state compensation statutes are rightly viewed as the best
of even less appealing alternative methods of redress for the wrongly convicted.10 While federal civil rights and some common law tort suits can be
extremely successful in particularly egregious cases in which government misconduct caused the wrongful conviction, such misconduct is not present in
some cases and difficult to prove in others.11 Private legislative bills to compensate the unjustly convicted require political muscle and fortitude, if the state
permits such private bills at all,12 and, therefore, promise to help very few of
the wrongfully convicted.13
To be sure, the decades since Professor Borchard’s initial proposal have
seen progress. The number of states with compensation statutes has increased
steadily. Some of the more recent statutes, or amendments to older statutes,
are more sensitive to evolving societal perceptions of the horrors of wrongful
incarceration. Caps are being raised and more statutes offer elements of restorative reentry services that many exonerees need. But the balance between state
10. Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 2, at 706–08; Lopez, supra note 2, at
704; Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated – How to
Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV. 503, 510–17
(2011).
11. Other scholars have canvassed the range of difficulties in obtaining compensation for wrongful convictions through civil rights and tort theories. Shawn Armbrust,
Note, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 161–66 (2004); Michael Avery, Obstacles
to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 439 (2009); Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 2, at 722–38; Bernhard, When
Justice Fails, supra note 6, at 87–92; Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven
Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 131–34 (2010); Lopez, supra note 2, at
690–98; Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convictions,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 136–52 (2010).
12. Some state constitutions bar private bills. See, e.g., Twp. of Mahwah v. Bergen Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 831–83 (N.J. 1985); Rector v. State, 495 P.2d
826, 827 (Okla. 1972); Adams v. Harris Cty., 530 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975).
13. As of 2009, only 9% of the 240 people exonerated by DNA evidence obtained
compensation through a private bill. Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully
Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 13
(2009), https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/innocence_pro
ject_compensation_report-6.pdf [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT, Making Up for Lost
Time]. See also Armbrust, supra note 11, at 167–68; Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What Works, What Doesn’t
and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 408–09 (2009); Kahn, supra note 12, at 134–35;
Lopez, supra note 2, at 698–700. As Professor Bernhard points out, the fact that some
wrongly convicted individuals receive compensation through a private legislative bill
supports the notion that there is a moral obligation to compensate such people. Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 6, at 96.
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fiscal concerns and just redress remains askew. This imbalance palpably harms
a category of claimants to state compensation and support that are among those
least deserving of parsimony and least equipped to surmount it.
States, though, have reason to worry. Tort-based full compensation in
these cases can be enormous. Fear of episodic, unplanned, and potentially
large payouts in wrongful conviction cases leads to tough prerequisites to recovery and ungenerous prescribed awards and caps.14 The uncertainty and
worry of fiscal exposure that drives caps is real and understandable. As discussed further below, following several substantial judgments in favor of
wrongly convicted individuals, Connecticut replaced its progressive uncapped
statute with one that imposes damage caps. A proposal to do the same was
made in the District of Columbia.15 It is not enough, then, to view state compensation statutes only from the perspective of the claimants, deserving as they
are for compensatory relief. We must consider the interests of the state as well.
A reassessment of these statutes should begin by understanding that the
exonerated have different characteristics and needs. Some of the wrongly convicted are exonerated and released from custody at the same time; others are
exonerated well after release. The former are very likely to have immediate
needs for financial, medical, and social service support, while the needs of the
latter may be less pressing. For some, unjust imprisonment was relatively
brief. For others, it spanned decades. Some experienced devastating injuries
while incarcerated, such as assaults, solitary confinement, psychiatric harm,
and contraction of infectious diseases like HIV and hepatitis C, while others
managed to avoid these kinds of harms. Some lost opportunities to parent children born prior to incarceration and to care for aging parents; others did not.
Some were educated and employed when convicted and thus clearly suffered
lost wages, while others had different educational and employment profiles.
Some may be eager, or at least willing, to devote the time, resources, and emotional energy to litigating such claims and exposing their harms – and potential
government misconduct – to the public, while others may be reluctant to wage
a second battle – often painful, expensive, and lengthy – against the government that wrongfully imprisoned them.
Instead of accounting for the varying characteristics, needs, and inclinations of the exonerated, most state statutes mechanically set unyielding, but
widely variant, per-year awards and damage caps. There is a better way. The
approach I recommend here is based in large part on my empirical research,
which has gathered compensation claims data for each of the 1900 persons
14. Lopez, supra note 2, at 705. The most absurdly low are those of New Hampshire and Wisconsin, which cap damages at $20,000 and $25,000, respectively, regardless of the duration of the wrongful incarceration. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West
2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2017). The Wisconsin State Assembly unanimously passed a bill in February 2016, increasing the cap to $1 million. Assemb. 460,
102d Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2016). The bill, however, died in the state Senate. Senate Puts
Off Vote on Conviction Compensation, WIS. L.J. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://wislawjournal.com/2016/02/16/senate-set-to-approve-conviction-compensation/.
15. See infra Part II.C.
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listed in the National Registry of Exonerations as wrongly convicted in a state
court since 1989. The results of that study are summarized, state by state, in
Table 1. They show that a surprisingly small percentage of exonerees seek and
obtain state compensation and that the average amounts paid per year of wrongful incarceration are disappointingly low.
The reassessment of state compensation statutes presented here considers
five elements: (1) the funding mechanism, (2) compensatory adequacy, (3) the
provision of non-monetary social and other services, (4) claimant choice, and
(5) an opportunity for expedited resolution. These design elements are drawn
and adapted from two different federal approaches to remedying harms to large
numbers of people – the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund – regarded as among the more
successful mass tort compensation schemes developed to substitute for, in
whole or in part, traditional tort-based litigation. Together, a redesign involving certain elements of these programs can both relieve some state fiscal concerns and allow the exonerated to select a remedial approach that better suits
his or her individual needs.
Before venturing too far, I should reveal the source of my perspective. I
represented four men in their claims for damages – Donald Gates, Kirk Odom,
Santae Tribble, and Cleveland Wright – who were wrongfully convicted of serious crimes in the District of Columbia.16 Each of these men spent over 20
years in prison for crimes they did not commit.17 Donald Gates was in prison
when DNA analysis exonerated him, after which he was immediately released.18 Our remaining three clients, in contrast, spent long periods on postrelease parole prior to exoneration.19 For each client, my co-counsel and I

16. I have served as co-counsel in these cases with the New York law firm of
Neufeld, Scheck & Brustin. See Gates v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 11-0040
(D.D.C.); Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239 (D.C. Super. Ct.); Tribble
v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B (D.C. Super. Ct.); Tribble v. Greene,
Civ. No. 15-710 (D.D.C.); Wright v. Greene, Civ. No. 15-1067 (D.D.C.). Peter Neufeld
and Barry Scheck of that firm are the co-founders and co-directors of the Innocence
Project. About, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
17. Gates v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014); Odom v.
District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *1–3 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015); Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B,
2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); United States v.
Wright, No. 1978 FEL 4060 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2015) (Amended Certificate of
Actual Innocence).
18. See Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1; see also Donald Eugene Gates, NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3233 (last updated Nov. 20, 2015) [hereinafter
Gates, NAT’L REGISTRY].
19. See generally Kirk Odom, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3943
(last updated Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Odom, NAT’L REGISTRY]; Santae Tribble,
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sought damages under the uncapped D.C. Unjust Imprisonment Act (“D.C.
Act”).20 In Gates, Tribble, and Wright, we also filed federal civil rights claims,
asserting that police misconduct caused the wrongful conviction.21
The pain of failure does not warp my perspective. As explained further
below, D.C. Superior Court judges awarded Kirk Odom $9,654,500 and Santae
Tribble $13,236,527 in damages under the D.C. Act.22 Following a federal jury
trial in which two former D.C. homicide detectives were found liable for federal civil rights violations, the case brought by Donald Gates settled for
$16,650,000 – the largest single-person settlement in D.C. history.23 Each of
the cases, and the one brought by Cleveland Wright, has now settled.24 These
cases have taught me that litigation success is both possible and of enormous
benefit to those who unquestionably deserve it, but it is also painful, protracted,
and potentially fleeting.
In Part II, I discuss the cases of Kirk Odom and Santae Tribble brought
under the D.C. Act. Those recent cases offer insight into how two different
judges approached the difficult remedial questions presented. They also
demonstrate how dramatically most statutes undercompensate claimants. In
Part III, I describe how I drew data provided by the National Registry of Exonerations, and many other sources, to document which exonerees filed state
compensation claims and how those claims were decided. The resulting data
show the percentages of exonerees who filed claims and were awarded compensation and the costs of such awards. In Part IV, I analyze aspects of existing
state compensation statutes. In Part V, I explore the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
In Part VI, I extract design elements of those statutes and draw lessons from

NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (July 3, 2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3926 (last updated July 19, 2016) [hereinafter Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY]; Cleveland Wright, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS
(Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4365 (last updated July 19, 2016) [hereinafter Wright, NAT’L
REGISTRY].
20. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-421–425 (West 2017).
21. See supra notes 18–19.
22. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Orders D.C. to Pay $13.2 Million in Wrongful FBI Hair
Conviction Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-orders-dc-to-pay-132-million-in-wrongful-fbi-hair-convictioncase/2016/02/28/da82e178-dcde-11e5-81ae7491b9b9e7df_story.html?utm_term=.8e969d83e73c; Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. to Pay
$9.2 Million in Wrongful Conviction, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/judge-orders-dc-to-pay-record-91-million-in-wrongfulconviction-case/2015/02/27/f54edaa6-beea-11e4-8668-4e7ba8439ca6_story.html.
23. Spencer S. Hsu, District to Pay $16.65 Million to Wrongfully Imprisoned Man,
Attorneys Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/district-to-pay-1665-million-to-wrongly-imprisoned-man-attorneyssay/2015/11/19/2f62fd58-8ecf-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html.
24. See supra notes 18–19.
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the empirical research to propose statutory reforms that are both mindful of
state interests and more just for exonerees.

II. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A LOST YEAR?
A. Kirk Odom
On February 24, 1981, not far from the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C.,
the lives of two young people were changed forever. At about six in the morning, S.Y., a white woman, was asleep in her house.25 At the same time, Kirk
Odom, an 18-year-old African American man, was asleep in the house he
shared with his mother, step-father, and several siblings, a couple of miles
away.26 A man entered S.Y.’s dark home, bound and blindfolded her, and then
sexually assaulted her.27 He stole items from her house but left behind semen
on her nightgown and pillow, as well as a pubic hair.28
Despite a very brief opportunity to view the assailant in the dark and under extreme stress, S.Y. assisted a sketch artist in drawing the face of her rapist.29 The resulting drawing was circulated among D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department officers, one of whom saw Mr. Odom walking down the street and
thought that he might resemble the man depicted in the drawing.30 Ultimately,
S.Y. made a positive, but incorrect, cross-racial identification of him in a photo
array, a police lineup, and at trial.31 That, along with the scientifically invalid
testimony of an FBI hair examiner who stated that Mr. Odom’s hair and the
pubic hair left at the scene were microscopically similar, was enough convict
Mr. Odom.32 The man who actually committed this heinous crime was a convicted sex offender, not Kirk Odom.33 Over twenty-two years later, at age
forty, Mr. Odom was released on parole.34 Subsequent DNA testing exonerated Mr. Odom, who received his certificate of actual innocence from a D.C.
Superior Court judge ten years later, on his fiftieth birthday.35
Mr. Odom experienced an unspeakable ordeal in the many prisons to
which he was transferred during his incarceration. Physical brutality, severe
emotional suffering, serious illness, and a toxic combination of intense fear and
unrelieved boredom marked his days, each of which began with the thoughts
25. Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS
2, at *4–5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015).
26. Id. at *4.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at *3, *13.
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *4–5.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *5.
35. Id. at *13.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/7

8

Gutman: An Empirical Reexamination

2017]

STATE COMPENSATION FOR THE WRONGLY CONVICTED

377

that he should not be where he was, that his life was slipping away from him,
and that there was nothing he could do about it.36 While incarcerated, he lost
contact with his daughter who was born two weeks before he was convicted,
lost his younger brother to a senseless murder, and briefly lost his grip on reality.37

B. Santae Tribble
Early on the morning of July 26, 1978, a taxi driver named John McCormick returned from his shift to his home in a gritty southeast D.C. neighborhood.38 He parked near his home, put his earnings in the trunk of his cab, and
trudged to the front door of his house. Before he could get inside, a man wearing a stocking mask fatally shot him in the chest and rifled through his pockets.39 At the same time, 17-year-old Santae Tribble was asleep at his mother’s
Maryland apartment with relatives and family friends.40 Hours later, a canine
officer found the mask.41 At Mr. Tribble’s 1980 trial, an FBI hair examiner
testified that a hair found on that mask matched Mr. Tribble’s.42 A police informant also testified that Mr. Tribble and his co-defendant, Cleveland Wright,
sold her roommate a .32 caliber handgun – the same type of “Saturday night
special” gun used in the McCormick shooting – a few days after the murder.43
She also testified that Mr. Tribble made incriminating statements to her.44
That evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Tribble, who was sentenced
to concurrent terms of twenty years to life in prison.45 He was ultimately paroled in 2003, after serving precisely 25 years.46 The police kept the hairs
found in the stocking mask.47 Using DNA analysis, it was determined that one
belonged to a dog, and the others did not belong to Mr. Tribble or Mr. Wright.48
36. Id. at *5–6.
37. Id. at *5–7.
38. Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super.

LEXIS 4, at *5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016). The published opinion in Tribble was
subsequently modified to correct small factual errors and an arithmetical mistake in the
calculation of damages. Tribble v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 2013-CA-003237B, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2016). See also Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY,
supra note 19.
39. See Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *15; Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY,
supra note 19.
40. See generally Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 19.
41. Id.
42. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *15; Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra
note 19.
43. Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 19.
44. Id.
45. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *1.
46. Id. at *11.
47. Id. at *15.
48. Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 19.
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The police informant later testified under oath that the gun was sold to her
roommate prior to the murder, that officers instructed her to change the exculpatory date of sale in her diary, and that, contrary to trial testimony that the gun
was lost, she actually provided it to the police.49
Incarcerated at age 17, prison was harrowing for Mr. Tribble. He spent
long periods in solitary confinement, once in restraints for days.50 He found
temporary relief from boredom, fear, and despair in heroin, but he contracted
serious diseases as a result.51 Following his release, Mr. Tribble returned to
the District of Columbia to rebuild his life.52 He found two jobs he enjoyed,
only to lose both when a vindictive parole officer sabotaged them.53 Depressed
and discouraged, several parole violations followed before a D.C Superior
Court judge exonerated him in 2012, 34 years after Mr. McCormick’s slaying.54
One can read the psychological literature about the effects of wrongful
conviction55 and prepare a client for trial testimony over and over again, but
there is something about hearing a man testify about the horrors of incarceration in the same courthouse in which he was wrongly convicted that can, and
should, shudder the souls of even the most stoic. Far worse, to have to testify
and withstand cross-examination about intensely personal details of prison and
post-prison life, to hear family members eulogize you in the courtroom, and to

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *10.
Id. at *46–47.
Id. at *10–11.
Id. at *12–13.
Id. at *15–16.
Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, The Burden of Innocence: Coping with
a Wrongful Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 139, 139–64
(2004); Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, Miscarriages of Justice: The Impact of
Wrongful Imprisonment, 13 JUST. RES. 5 (2005); Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, “I
Was Put out the Door with Nothing” – Addressing the Needs of the Exonerated Under
A Refugee Model, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 405, 405–44 (2009); Mary C. Delaney, Keith A.
Findley & Sheila Sullivan, Exonerees’ Hardships After Freedom, WIS. LAW., Feb.
2010, at 18, http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=83&Issue=2&ArticleID=1925#bio; Adrian Grounds, Psychological
Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J.
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004); Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding the Effects of Wrongful Imprisonment, 32 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2005); Adina M. Thompson,
Oscar R. Molina & Lora M. Levett, After Exoneration: An Investigation of Stigma and
Wrongfully Convicted Persons, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1373 (2012); Leslie Scott, “It Never,
Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Incarceration, 5 AM. U. CRIM. L.
BRIEF 10 (2010); Heather Weigand, Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and
Exonerated, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 427 (2009); Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J.
Cook, Coping with Innocence after Death Row, CONTEXTS, Fall 2008, at 32; Saundra
D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Framing Innocents: The Wrongfully Convicted as
Victims of State Harm, 53 CRIME, L., & SOC. CHANGE 259 (2010).
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hear expert witnesses discuss your mental and emotional health and your diminished life expectancy in public and with reporters watching, is grueling and
tortuous. It takes a particularly strong person to endure this kind of litigation.
If nothing else, exonerees like Mr. Odom and Mr. Tribble deserve compassion,
and litigation is not a very compassionate exercise. But, the D.C. Act, like
those of several other states, requires essentially a relitigation of the post-conviction proceedings, an exercise made necessary when the government is disinclined to consider settlement.

C. The D.C. Act
The D.C. Act56 is, comparatively, a very progressive statute. Following
the exoneration of Bradford Brown in 1979 for a murder he did not commit,
the D.C. City Council exercised its authority under the District of Columbia
Home Rule Act57 to supplement the pre-existing federal wrongful conviction
remedy.58 Its aim was “to create a civil cause of action against the District of
Columbia on behalf of persons who are convicted and subsequently imprisoned
for offenses which they did not commit.”59
The Council’s heart was in the right place; it viewed compensation as a
moral imperative of government. The Judiciary Committee explained that the
bill was “[g]rounded upon the principle of fundamental fairness.”60 Because
unjust imprisonment can occur only because of “governmental error,” the
Committee stated that “a remedy should be made available by the District of
56. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421 (West 2017).
57. Id. § 1-201.02.
58. In the District of Columbia, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department investi-

gates violations of the D.C. criminal code. See id. § 5-133.17. Criminal defendants are
tried in the D.C. Superior Court before a superior court judge and jury. See id. § 16705. Congress, however, determined that prosecutions for most violations of the D.C.
Code would be conducted “in the name of the United States by the United States attorney for the District of Columbia.” Id. § 23-101(c); see also In re Crawley, 978 A.2d
608, 620 (D.C. 2009). As a result, those wrongly convicted in District of Columbia
had (before passage of the D.C. Act) and still have an additional remedy against the
United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2012). Since 2004, the federal
wrongful conviction compensation statute has awarded the wrongfully convicted up to
$50,000 per year of incarceration, or up to $100,000 of incarceration per year on death
row. See Stephanie Slifer, How the Wrongfully Convicted Are Compensated for Years
Lost, CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:33AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-thewrongfully-convicted-are-compensated/. From 1938 to 2004, the federal statute permitted the award of only $5000 in total for unjust convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e)
(amended 2004); see also Alan Vinegrad & Douglas Bloom, Compensating the
Wrongly Convicted, 238 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Oct. 2007).
59. COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT 1 (July 9, 1980) [hereinafter
D.C. COMM. REPORT]; see also Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239,
2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015).
60. D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 2; Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2,
at *16.
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Columbia to compensate the tragic consequences of such errors when they do
occur.”61
The cause of action against the District is codified in section 2-421 of the
D.C. Code, which provides simply that “[a]ny person unjustly convicted of and
subsequently imprisoned for a criminal offense contained in the District of Columbia Official Code may present a claim for damages against the District of
Columbia.”62 The compensation provision is plain: if a judge finds that the
plaintiff has met the statutory prerequisites, “the judge may award damages.”63
Rare among compensation schemes, the District of Columbia’s no-fault
statute is uncapped, and damages are not restricted to post-conviction years
served in prison. Indeed, proposals to place limitations on the amount of damages available under the Act were repeatedly rejected.64 The Council expressly
wished to avoid “arbitrary” caps that may restrict a claimant from recovering
an amount warranted for actual suffering under “traditional legal methods of
assessing damages.”65 Thus, common law tort principles of full compensation
for loss govern the award of damages under the Act.66 The Council viewed the
prohibition on punitive damages and the requirement that cases be heard by a
judge rather than a jury as the devices needed to limit excessive fiscal exposure.67
From a remedial perspective, the District of Columbia’s full, tort-based
compensation approach is one of the best in the country. But, like many older
statutes, it is not perfect. It requires separate civil litigation following postconviction relief. There is no provision for prompt interim financial support
and social services. There is no attorneys’ fees provision. There is no specific
provision for the expungement of the wrongful conviction. There is no deadline for the resolution of these cases. Nor does it incorporate provisions that
can ease the financial burden of statutory compensation on the District of Columbia.

D. Odom v. District of Columbia and Tribble v. District of Columbia
In Odom, the District of Columbia stipulated to liability under the D.C.
Act.68 After a 6-day trial on damages, Judge Neal Kravitz of the D.C. Superior
Court awarded Mr. Odom $9,154,500.69 Judge Kravitz recounted Mr. Odom’s
life story and his experiences in prison and after release, and he considered
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 2.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421.
Id. § 2-423.
D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 9.
Id.
Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS
2, at *25 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015).
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-423; D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 4.
68. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *2.
69. Id. at *57.
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expert testimony on his psychological and medical harm.70 He detailed Mr.
Odom’s 30 prison transfers, separation from his friends and family, and the
particular fear of violence (subsequently realized) as a person convicted of
rape.71 Judge Kravitz did what the legislative history of the Act said he should
do – assess damages based on traditional tort principles.
Judge Kravitz awarded Mr. Odom $1000 per day for each day of imprisonment, $250 per day for each day on parole, and $200 per day for each day
between his exoneration and the trial.72 The court initially denied Mr. Odom’s
request for future damages experienced after the date of trial, but following a
motion for reconsideration, the court decided to award Mr. Odom an additional
$500,000 for post-trial damages.73 Judge Kravitz denied Mr. Odom’s request
for lost wages on the ground that the wages were speculative.74 The District of
Columbia filed an appeal and the case later settled, nearly three years after it
was filed.75
In Tribble, the District of Columbia belatedly conceded liability at trial.76
D.C. Superior Court Judge John M. Mott heard testimony from Mr. Tribble,
his son, his friends, and expert witnesses.77 Without contradiction, those witnesses testified at length about the medical and psychological harm caused by
his wrongful imprisonment.78 Judge Mott followed Judge Kravitz’s interpretation of the Act and held that it required the award of full compensatory relief.79 He further rejected the testimony of the District of Columbia’s only
witness, an economist, who testified that Mr. Tribble suffered no economic loss
because, had he not been imprisoned, his consumption would have exceeded
his income.80 Judge Mott awarded Mr. Tribble $400,000 per year in damages
for post-conviction time in prison, $100,000 per year in post-release damages,
future medical expenses, and lost wages.81

70. See generally id.
71. Id. at *8–16.
72. Id. at *56–57. The opinion does not explain how the court arrived at those

numbers.
73. Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013 CA 3239, slip op. at 8, 9 (D.C. Super.
Ct. July 22, 2015).
74. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *48–51.
75. Id. at *26.
76. Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super.
LEXIS 4, at *17 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016).
77. Id. at *7, *18.
78. Id. at *12.
79. Id. at *13–15. The courts in Odom and Tribble held that the compensable
period begins on the date of conviction, not the date of pre-trial detention or the date of
sentencing. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *44–46; Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super.
LEXIS 4, at *20–21.
80. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *19.
81. Id. at *66. As with Odom, the court did not explain the basis for its choice of
those numbers.
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Odom and Tribble were triumphs of a progressive compensation statute.
The damage awards in Odom and Tribble were significantly higher, even accounting for inflation, than that of the court’s only other decision under the Act
– the 1985 judgment in Brown v. District of Columbia.82 It is beyond the scope
of this Article to determine whether awards in these types of cases have increased over time. But, the very small D.C. sample accords with an intuition
that, as American society has become more familiar with wrongful convictions
and the stories of those who have experienced it, greater value may be placed
on their pain and suffering. The evolving social understanding of just compensation in this context warrants the reexamination of state statutes with caps,
particularly those that have been in place for some time and that are increasingly out of step with this understanding.

E. Odom and Tribble and the Connecticut Epilogue
Not long after the ink on the judgment in Odom was dry, the D.C. Attorney General proposed legislation which would have had the effects of nullifying that verdict and of precluding the claims under the Act made by Santae
Tribble and Cleveland Wright.83 That legislation is bottled up in the Council’s
Judiciary Committee,84 but it offers a cautionary tale to those who view compensation statutes as the best way to ensure that the wrongfully convicted may
seek relief for the terrible injuries they suffer. These statutes could be victims
of their success. The wrongfully convicted might be unjustly punished twice
– once by the criminal jury and again by the legislature, which repeals or limits
the civil remedies they have.
So far, that has not happened in the District of Columbia,85 but it did happen in Connecticut, which was 1 of just 6 states without compensation caps.
82. The wrongful conviction of Bradford Brown prompted passage of the D.C.
Act. See Brown v. District of Columbia, No. 11595-81 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 12, 1985).
The Superior Court awarded Mr. Brown $325,000 for an unjust imprisonment lasting
over 3 years. Id. at 30. The judges in Odom and Tribble awarded post-release damages,
while Judge Urbina did not in Brown. Id.; Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *68–
70; Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *43, *51–57.
83. In the District of Columbia, the Attorney General has the authority to propose
legislation through the City Council. B21-0150 – Unjust Imprisonment Amendment
Act of 2015, COUNCIL OF THE D.C. (2015), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Legislation/B210150?FromSearchResults=true. His proposal, B21-0150, which is expressly retroactive, would impose an annual cap of $50,000 per year of incarceration, unless the plaintiff has received a settlement or obtained a judgment against the United States, in which
case the D.C. remedy is offset dollar by dollar. Id.
84. Id. See Irvin B. Nathan, Opinion, D.C. Needs to Revise Its Wrongful-Conviction Law, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dcneeds-to-revise-its-wrongful-conviction-law/2016/09/23/37faa1e4-7f94-11e6-8d0cfb6c00c90481_story.html?utm_term=.a2e36fb23708 (former D.C. Attorney General
argues for substantial limitations on D.C. Unjust Imprisonment Law).
85. On April 10, 2017, the Mayor of the District of Columbia proposed the FY
2018 Budget Support Act of 2017, B22-244, which included amendments to the Act
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In Connecticut, claimants were eligible to receive compensation if their convictions were vacated “on grounds of innocence, or the complaint or information [was] dismissed on a ground consistent with innocence.”86 Hearings
before the Claims Commissioner, the person empowered under Connecticut
law to determine eligibility and award damages, permitted the claimant to offer
evidence of categories of damages that reflected the legislature’s intention that
the award be fully compensatory.87
On January 15, 2016, the Connecticut Claims Commissioner awarded
$4.2 million each to 4 men whose convictions of a gang-related murder were
vacated on the ground that the prosecutor sponsored false testimony of a key
government witness.88 Each was imprisoned for about 17 years; the Commissioner awarded each $2.4 million for loss of liberty and enjoyment of life, $1.1
million for lost wages, $200,000 for loss of reputation, $100,000 for physical
and mental injury, and $200,000 for attorneys’ fees and costs.89 The award
was further enhanced by $200,000 for governmental “misconduct.”90 Considerable controversy surrounded this award for two reasons.91
First, the convictions of the 4 men were vacated on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, not factual innocence.92 Second, the amount of the awards
to men described in the press as gang members generated concern.93 The resulting legislation addresses both issues but in an unusual way. The amended
statute widens the eligibility criteria by explicitly permitting recovery to those
whose criminal complaint or indictment was dismissed on the grounds of an
act or omission “that constitutes malfeasance or other serious misconduct” of

that would set compensation at $200,000 per year of unjust imprisonment and $40,000
per year for each year served on parole, on probation, or as a registered sex offender.
FY 2018 Budget Support Act of 2017, B22-244, Subtit. C, § 1022.
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(a)(2) (amended 2016).
87. Id.
88. Mark Pazniokas, Claims Commissioner Resigns Amid Controversy, CT
MIRROR (Feb. 19, 2016), http://ctmirror.org/2016/02/19/claims-commissioner-resignsamid-controversy.
89. Memorandum of Decision: Wrongful Incarceration at 7–8, Claims of Carlos
Ashe et al. (Conn. Claims Comm’r Jan. 15, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Claim of Carlos Ashe]. The award for loss of liberty, reputation, and physical and
mental injury, totaling $2.7 million, comes to nearly $160,000 per year of incarceration,
a metric less than half of that awarded in Odom and Tribble. Id.
90. Id. at 8.
91. CT Needs New Rules, Oversight of Wrongful Conviction Awards, HARTFORD
COURANT (Feb. 24, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.courant.com/opinion/editorials/hced-claims-commish-needs-review-20160223-story.html; Pazniokas, supra note 88;
Max Reiss, Change Urged After Controversial Wrongful Conviction Payments, NBC
CONN. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Change-UrgedAfter-Controversial-Wrongful-Conviction-Payments-369507052.html.
92. See Claim of Carlos Ashe, supra note 89. Each of the 4 is listed in the Registry.
93. See sources cited supra note 91.
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a state officer or employee.94 It narrows the scope of compensation by limiting
awards to between one and two times the median state household income95 and
permitting the Claims Commissioner to increase or decrease that award by 25%
based on relevant factors.96 If that amount exceeds $20,000, or if the claimant
seeks review, the Connecticut General Assembly has 45 days to deny, confirm,
or modify the award.97 The new Connecticut statute also makes one additional,
worrisome change. Previously, acceptance of state compensation did not preclude other claims, like federal civil rights claims against other state actors.
Now, award of compensation under the statute requires the claimant to release
such claims.98
Table 1 shows that Connecticut’s overall payments and average payment
per exoneree were among the highest in the nation.99 Connecticut paid exonerees significantly more than California and Illinois combined, which together had almost 18 times as many exonerees who experienced time in prison.
That underscores California’s and Illinois’s parsimony, not Connecticut’s generosity. But more troubling is that Connecticut’s retrenchment appears to be
the first of its kind. Since 1913, states have slowly adopted more compensation
statutes and even more slowly increased the compensation permitted by
them.100
Perhaps Connecticut is a one-off reversal of that progressive trend explained by an idiosyncratic reaction to an unpopular Claims Commissioner and
awards to apparently disliked exonerees. But one wonders whether other progressive states hit by large damages verdicts, or states with more exonerees
than Connecticut, might similarly seek to limit those statutes.101 The argument
for such limitation must necessarily turn on concerns about cost. It is worth,
then, examining how costly these statutes have actually been.

94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(a)(2) (West 2017).
95. The median state household annual income in 2014 was $70,112. Kirby G.

Posey, Household Income: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/acsbr15-02.pdf.
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(d)(2).
97. Id. § 54-102uu(d)(1) (stating the Assembly can modify the award to any
amount it “deems just and reasonable”).
98. Id. § 54-102uu(g). Whether a state, by statute, can preclude state compensation recipients from the filing of federal civil rights claims is beyond the scope of this
Article.
99. Robert J. Norris, Exoneree Compensation: Current Policies and Future Outlook, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE
289, 294–95 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).
100. Id.
101. See generally supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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III. THE BIG PICTURE
A. Coverage of State Compensation Statutes
Over time, the number of states adopting compensation statutes for
wrongful imprisonment has grown and, with the District of Columbia, has now
reached 33.102 The adoption of such statutes has accelerated since the first
DNA exoneration in 1989.103 Nevertheless, the absence of universal national
coverage of such statutes is troubling. Eighteen states (and Guam and Puerto
Rico) fail to offer statutory redress for wrongful convictions. How many exonerees fall within that gap?
The National Registry of Exonerations, a project of the University of California, Irvine, Newkirk Center for Science & Society, the University of Michigan Law School, and the Michigan State University College of Law, maintains
a database of individuals convicted of crimes but later exonerated based on new
evidence of innocence since 1989.104 As of March 1, 2017, the cut-off date for
this analysis, there were 2000 listed exonerations.105 That averages about 71
per year for the 28 years covered by the Registry.106 The Registry identifies
each exoneree by state of conviction.107
For purposes of determining the current breadth of coverage of state compensation statutes, I make an important counterfactual assumption. I assume
that all 1900 individuals wrongly convicted in a state court since 1989 were
actually exonerated on March 1, 2017, rather than on the actual date of exoneration. How many were unjustly convicted in a state that now has a compensation statute?

102. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
103. Norris, supra note 99, at 294–95; Owens & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 1286–
87.
104. About the Registry, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (last visited Mar. 20,
2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx.
105. Id.
106. The number of exonerations, however, has steadily increased over time. Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (last visited
Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-byYear.aspx. The year 2016 saw a record number of exonerations: 166. Exonerations in
2016,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS
1
(Mar.
7,
2017),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf.
107. Detailed
View,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Mar.
1, 2017) [hereinafter COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY]. Of the 2000 exonerated individuals, 100 were convicted in a federal or military court. Id. These individuals may be
entitled to compensation under the federal wrongful conviction statute. 28 U.S.C. §§
1495, 2513 (2012). Thus, the Registry shows that 1900 persons were wrongly convicted in a state or territorial court. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra.
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The results are reflected in Table 1. Column B of the Table indicates
whether the state now has a compensation statute and the year of its enactment.108 Column C is the number of exonerated individuals wrongly convicted
in a state court of that state since 1989. In total, 1674 of 1900 exonerees, or
88.1%, were convicted in states or territories that now have a statute. The Registry lists 226 of 1900 exonerees convicted in the 18 states and 2 territories
(Guam and Puerto Rico) without statutes.109 Put differently, while only about
60% of the states and territories have statutes, those states were home, at the
time of conviction, to nearly 90% of the listed exonerees on the Registry.110
That result accords with a reasonable intuition that states with more
wrongful convictions are more likely, perhaps because of that experience, to
have a compensation statute.111 Indeed, this intuition is confirmed by recent
analysis. In 2012, political scientists Michael Leo Owens and Elizabeth Griffiths examined the 289 DNA exonerations identified at that point by the Innocence Project.112 They found that “the mean number of exonerations in states
with compensation laws is significantly larger . . . than the mean number of
exonerations in states that have failed to enact a compensation statute.”113 Owens and Griffiths then hypothesized why this might be and ran a series of statistical analyses to test the influence of interest group pressure, punitive regimes, and government ideology.114 They found that only interest group pressure, which they measured to include the number of exonerations and the presence of an Innocence Project in the state, was positively associated with the
presence of a state compensation statute.115

108. I included Michigan, even though its new statute took effect after March 1,

2017.
109. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
110. The Registry further identifies exonerated individuals who were not incarcer-

ated in prison – including those remanded to a mental hospital, sentenced to community
service, fined, with suspended licenses, not sentenced at all, who received probation,
or whose sentences were unknown. Id. Column D of Table 1 identifies the number of
incarcerated exonerees per state. See infra Table 1. Of the 1900 state or territorial
exonerees, 1719 were incarcerated in a jail or prison. See infra Table 1. Of those,
1509, or 87.8%, were convicted in a state that, as of March 1, 2017, has a state compensation statute. See infra Table 1.
111. Norris, supra note 99, at 297 (finding correlation between the number of exonerations and the existence of a state compensation statute). However, Professor Norris believes that “the sociocultural and political environments in which reform efforts
take place,” particularly the intensity of innocence advocacy and media attention on
particular cases, better explains the diffusion of compensation statutes. Id. at 295–99.
112. Owens & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 1283. Exonerations following DNA analysis are among the exonerations listed in the Registry. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY,
supra note 107.
113. Owens & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 1308, 1310 fig.2B.
114. Id. at 1289.
115. Id. at 1321. The authors were careful not to infer causation from this relationship.
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A look generally at all exonerations, rather than just DNA exonerations,
seems consistent with this conclusion. The 4 states with the largest number of
exonerees as of March 1, 2017 – Texas (309), New York (224), Illinois (184),
and California (173) – have statutes.116 Eleven of the 18 states without statutes
have 8 or fewer exonerees.117 There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general
finding. As explained, the District of Columbia enacted its compensation statute after only 1 wrongful conviction. Several states with a compensation statute have few exonerees: Colorado (7), Hawaii (3), Maine (2), Montana (9),
New Hampshire (1), and Vermont (1).118 At the same time, Pennsylvania (60),
Georgia (29), and Indiana (24) are the states with the largest number of exonerees without compensation statutes.119
That is not to say that universal coverage is an unworthy goal. Every state
should have a no-fault compensation statute. The failure of the 18 states to
have one has left scores of wrongly convicted persons without the possibility
of state statutory redress. However, it does suggest how pro-compensation advocates might prioritize their resources. Assuming that the relative numbers
of exonerations among states remain stable over time, seeking reform of existing weak statutes, particularly in states with large numbers of exonerees, could
help more people than expanding the number of states with a compensation
statute, especially states with low numbers of exonerees.120

B. Use and Costs of State Compensation Statutes
To be sure, the wrongfully incarcerated suffer grievously, and those profound injuries have prompted most states to impose compensation caps for fear
that awards based on a D.C.-like tort damage statute would be unpredictably
higher. It is worth testing the source of that worry by asking how much these
statutes actually cost. The answer is far less than one might reasonably think,
amounting to a tiny percentage of state corrections budgets.
116. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
117. Alaska (8), Arkansas (6), Delaware (2), Idaho (2), Kansas (7), New Mexico

(6), North Dakota (2), Rhode Island (5), South Carolina (7), South Dakota (4), and
Wyoming (3). Id. Of the 10 states with the largest per capita numbers of exonerations
from 1989 to 2013, only Wyoming lacks a compensation statute. See Exonerations in
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS
20
(Feb.
4,
2014),
2013,
NAT’L
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2013_Report.pdf.
118. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
119. Id.
120. Of course, advocates should seize on well-publicized wrongful convictions,
which sometimes get more state-wide press coverage when they are rare, to press for
state compensation statutes; this recently happened in Alaska. See, e.g., Megan Edge,
New Bill Would Give Payouts to Wrongfully Convicted Alaskans, ALASKA DISPATCH
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.adn.com/crime-justice/article/exonerated-alaskanscould-reap-financial-benefits/2016/02/06/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2016) (sponsor of
Alaska proposal inspired by wrongful convictions in the Fairbanks Four case).
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1. The Data Collection Process
To calculate these costs, I again relied on the data provided in the National
Registry of Exonerations. As noted in Table 1, as of March 1, 2017, the Registry shows that 1674 individuals were convicted of crimes in state courts in
states that today have compensation statutes. Of those, 165 were not incarcerated and would not be eligible for compensation under any state statute.121 The
resulting total, 1509, listed by state, is found in Column D of Table 1. The task
has been to record who among this group has been awarded compensation and
how much was received.
Academic studies and some detailed press reports have documented the
amounts paid to exonerees under particular state compensation statutes.122 A
number of states publish state compensation awards, decisions, and denials
online. The Registry has researched state statutory and other forms of compensation for a substantial number of exonerees.123 It has summarized that
information within the public narrative descriptions associated with each exoneree.124 The Innocence Project has documented compensation awards in
some cases involving DNA exonerations and provided that data to me. Witness
to Innocence, which focuses on death penalty cases, has done the same.
In addition, I received data from a number of states following FOIA or
other records requests. Government personnel in those states have been exceptionally helpful in gathering and providing me that information and generous
with their time in responding to follow-up inquiries. I have also reviewed press
reporting, obtained information on public databases, court records, and judicial
opinions, and have received data from practicing attorneys. In sum, I have
reasonably precise data from all of the 33 jurisdictions with state compensation
statutes.
While I am confident that I obtained substantially complete data on
awards125 and denials, determining precisely which exonerees did not file
121. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. These individuals are recorded
as having zero time lost in the Registry. Id.
122. See, e.g., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY,
BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, CRIMINAL (IN)JUSTICE: A COST ANALYSIS OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, ERRORS, AND FAILED PROSECUTIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2015); Dan Glaun, Massachusetts Has Paid $8.34 Million Under
Wrongful Conviction Compensation Law, MASSLIVE (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:30 AM),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/08/massachusetts_has_paid_834_mil.html (last updated Aug. 31, 2016, 7:31 AM); Johnathan Silver
& Lindsay Carbonell, Wrongful Convictions Have Cost Texans More Than $93 Million,
TRIB.
(June
24,
2016,
6:00
AM),
https://www.texastribTEX.
une.org/2016/06/24/wrongful-convictions-cost-texans-over-93-million/.
123. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
124. Id.
125. I very seldom encountered a state award of compensation in an undisclosed
amount. I coded those as a grant but did not speculate on the amount. At least 2 states
that lack a statute, Arkansas and Georgia, had made modest awards legislatively or
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claims at all is clearer in some states than others. However, as noted, wrongful
conviction compensation has been the subject of detailed academic study and
press reporting, based on analysis of government documents, in several states,
including California, Massachusetts, and Texas. Other states, such as Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin, maintain comprehensive databases or reports of claims. The absence of a
claim made by an exoneree in those materials raises a very strong inference
that no claim was made. For many other states, conversations with government
officials and reviews of press reporting allowed similarly strong inferences to
be made. At bottom, while the number of non-filers may be overstated, any
variation is likely to be modest.
At the same time, this is not a static process. Additions are made to the
Registry frequently – both newly exonerated individuals and recently discovered exonerees of the past. New administrative claims or lawsuits are filed,
and existing claims are decided. As a result, I tagged people whose relatively
recent exoneration dates lie within the applicable statute of limitations as
“premature” when I found no evidence of a claim being filed. For those individuals, filing remains possible as of the time of this writing. When I had definitive information or a strong suspicion that a claim was filed, but undecided,
I labeled the individual as “pending.”

2. Data Analysis
The result of this research is shown in Table 1. Column B indicates
whether the state listed in Column A has a compensation statute and, if so,
when it was originally adopted. Starting with the number of exonerees listed
in the National Registry of Exonerations for each state with a statute (Column
C), I set aside those the Registry showed as serving no time in prison, leaving
the number of individuals I call “incarcerated exonerees” in Column D. Because each statute requires individuals to have been imprisoned to award compensation, I presumed that those who did not serve time did not file a claim.
Non-filing incarcerated exonerees fall into 2 categories. Column E lists
the number of relatively new “premature” exonerees, which total 236, who
have not filed but still have time to file claims.126 Column F states the number
through state claims processes. I excluded those awards because the state did not have
a statute.
126. Over half of those “premature” claims are in Michigan and Texas. Michigan
very recently passed a compensation law. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1751–
691.1757 (West 2017). Because it does not explicitly preclude those exonerated prior
to the effective date of the statute from filing a claim, I coded each previously incarcerated Michigan exoneree as “premature.” In addition, Texas has a large number of exonerees in this category because many people in Harris County were recently determined to be wrongly convicted on drug offenses based on inaccurate field tests of suspicious substances. See Lise Olsen & Anita Hassan, 298 Wrongful Drug Convictions
Identified in Ongoing Audit, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 16, 2016),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/298-wrongful-
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of incarcerated exonerees (576) who appear not to have filed a claim and who
cannot do so due to the statute of limitations. As shown at the bottom of Column G, and discussed below, 38.17% of the exonerated persons in states with
compensation statutes did not file a claim. That number will rise when any
person coded as “premature” does not file within the applicable statute of limitations. When considering all exonerees, including those convicted in states
without statutes, the percentage of non-filing increases to over 45%.
Incarcerated exonerees who did file a claim for compensation under the
state statute (listed by state in Column H) fall into three categories. Column I
lists the number of persons who filed claims and were awarded compensation.127 That total is 523 and will rise if premature cases are filed and paid and
when claimants prevail in pending cases. Column K states the number of persons who filed claims and were denied compensation.128 The total is 109 and
drug-convictions-identified-in-8382474.php. Because most of these exonerees were
incarcerated rather briefly, I would expect that few will file for compensation. In addition, for some states, it is difficult to determine whether claims are filed before they
are decided. It is possible that a number of claims coded as “premature” are actually
“pending.”
127. Some exonerees have received compensation by act of the state legislature,
typically in the absence of an existing state statute. I have included those, nevertheless,
in the count of claims granted in states now with statutes so as not to understate state
costs. In addition, there are exonerees who are awarded damages but have not received
payment, frequently because of state budgetary issues. This is particularly true in Illinois. See infra note 237. Nonetheless, I counted a claim as granted even if not paid.
128. Table 1 shows that 109 claims, or 15.6%, were denied. See infra Table 1. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze why a state would deny a claim for compensation by someone listed on the Registry as an exoneree, but a substantial number
were denied because the claimant failed to show by a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence that he or she was actually innocent of the crime for which he or she
was wrongly convicted. This happens with some frequency. For example, in California, the claimant must prove that “the crime with which he or she was charged was
either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2017). Of 23 claims denied in California, my research
found that 19 were denied, at least in part, on the ground that the claimant failed to
satisfy the statutory innocence standard. It is more difficult to make a similar assessment for New York, the state with the highest number of denied claims (39) because of
the lack of availability of orders denying some of those claims.
The reason why a person may be listed in the National Registry of Exonerations but fails to show innocence for compensation lies in differences between state
statutory requirements, the burden on the claimant to establish them, and the definition
of “exoneration” used by the National Registry:
A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and later
was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or
agency with the authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the
consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body with
the authority to take that action. The official action may be: (i) a complete
pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether or not the pardon
is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an acquittal of all charges factually
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will rise as well. Column L notes the number of persons, now 65, who filed
claims that remain pending for decision.
Additional columns set forth data that provide a basis for cross-state comparison. Column G calculates the percentage of incarcerated exonerees listed
in the Registry who did not file for compensation.129 For states with more than
5 exonerees, Mississippi had the lowest percentage of non-filers (12.5%), while
Montana had the highest (100%). Large percentages of non-filers within a state
suggest a structural or statutory barrier that must be addressed, as discussed
below.
Column J identifies the percentage of filing incarcerated exonerees who
received an award.130 In theory, any exoneree listed on the Registry who seeks
state compensation should be awarded it. In reality, the percentage of granted
claims is just over 75%. That number, however, would increase as pending
claims are decided in the exoneree’s favor. States with relatively low grant
rates with few pending claims, such as California and Iowa, raise obvious questions.131 As noted, the California Crime Victim Compensation Board has applied the state statute’s showing of innocence requirement to deny the claims
of nineteen exonerees. Iowa has a much smaller sample size, but one claim

related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a
dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the person was originally
convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at least in
part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial at
which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known
to the defendant and the defense attorney, and to the court, at the time the plea
was entered. The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis for the
official action that exonerated the person.

Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). Depending on how a state
statute like California’s is applied in practice, the more forgiving language of the Registry, along with the statute’s placement of the burden of proof on the exoneree rather
than the government, can lead to disqualified exonerees. See Kahn, supra note 11, at
125–26 (noting that statutes should place burden on the government to prove guilt rather than on the exoneree to again prove innocence or present evidence consistent with
innocence).
129. Column G is the result of dividing the number of non-filing incarcerated exonerees (Column F) by the total number of incarcerated exonerees in the state. See infra
Table 1.
130. Column J is the result of dividing the number of claims granted to incarcerated
exonerees (Column I) by the number of claims made (Column H). See infra Table 1.
The number of claims made includes pending claims which, when decided, will change
the results.
131. Washington, for example, has a low award rate, but a number of pending
claims, approval of which would increase that rate.
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was denied by court on the same ground,132 and another was denied on the
ground that the state statute precludes those who pled guilty from compensation.133
Column M shows the percentage of incarcerated exonerees in each state
with a compensation statute who received an award.134 A low percentage could
have, in part, a worrisome explanation, like substantial non-filings and denials.
Or, it could be explained by innocent factors, such as high numbers of premature or pending claims. However, at the time of this writing, only just over
one-third – 34.7% – of incarcerated exonerees from states with statutes received compensation. That number drops to 30.4% when accounting for incarcerated exonerees from all states and territories.135
As described above, I have collected state statutory compensation data for
each individual wrongly convicted in a state court who is listed on the Registry.
Adding those awards together is reflected in Column N. Column N lists the
amounts paid by each state that currently has a compensation statute.136 The
total amount paid was $408.4 million, which, over the 28 years covered by the
Registry, amounts to an average of just $14.6 million per year nationally.137
Column O lists the average amount paid pursuant to state compensation
statutes to each incarcerated exoneree (whether or not the exoneree sought
compensation). That average ranges dramatically, from under $8000 per exoneree in Wisconsin, to over $2 million per exoneree in Connecticut and the
District of Columbia. The national average is $270,669. Including exonerees
in states without statutes, that average amount drops to $237,741.46 per exoneree.
Column P states the number of years lost to wrongful conviction in each
state as calculated by the Registry. Column Q divides the total amount paid by

132. Smith v. State, 845 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Iowa 2014). See also State v. DeSimone,
839 N.W.2d 660, 673 (Iowa 2013) (reversing and remanding finding of innocence for
review of broader record, including prior trial testimony).
133. Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 450–51 (Iowa 2016).
134. Column M is the result of dividing the number of claims awarded (Column I)
by the number of incarcerated exonerees (Column D). See infra Table 1.
135. That number omits a very small number of exonerees who received a legislative award or compensation through a general state claims program in states without a
wrongful conviction compensation statute.
136. The total in Texas includes annuity payments made through June, 2016. I have
also included in the Illinois costs all awards made, even though, as a result of budgetary
deadlock, many recent exonerees have yet to be paid.
137. On rare occasions, I have found state wrongful conviction compensation payments for persons not on the Registry. I have excluded those from the cost total. A
small number of states reported amounts of attorneys’ fees or costs awarded. Because
that money is not paid to the claimant, and because the data are not uniformly available,
I have omitted including it in the cost figures. Doing so undercounts the costs of these
statutes to the states.
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those number of years to obtain a per-year amount for each state with a statute.138 The average amount paid per year lost to wrongful incarceration ranges
enormously from $1112.36 in Wisconsin to $183,584.91 in Connecticut. Put
differently, the value the state assigns to a year of lost liberty is 165 times
higher in Connecticut than in Wisconsin. The overall average amount received
per incarcerated exoneree per year (whether he or she filed or not) in states that
now have statutes is $26,846.31; nationally (counting states without statutes),
the annual average is $23,701.03. That figure is lower than the 2017 poverty
rate for a family of four and significantly less than half of the 2015 national
median household income.139
I do make an important assumption that understates the cost of these statutes. I do not consider the costs of non-monetary relief, such as social services,
tuition assistance, and attorneys’ fees. I generally have no basis for monetizing
most of those forms of relief, but those costs are likely to be reasonably modest.
The marginal cost of providing an exoneree vocational training in a state-operated program or free or reduced cost education at a state college, valuable as
they are, is likely to be relatively small. Nor do I account for reimbursements
for court costs, fees, and other expenses incurred during the wrongful conviction, or for the governmental costs in processing, deciding, or administering
these claims.
States are understandably concerned about the potential costs of progressive wrongful conviction compensation statutes. But, when the historical record is viewed nationally and over time, the gravity of these concerns fades. Of
course, payments will trend upward as currently pending or premature cases
are resolved in the future. The reality, however, is that the amount paid nationally to a surprisingly small percentage of exonerees over the last 28 years is
remarkably modest. And, the average amount paid per year per exoneree is
roughly tantamount to a low-wage job, effectively awarding little or nothing
for loss of liberty. Just as striking is the unfairness inherent in the extraordinary

138. This figure will in large part be driven by the statutory metric for compensation
discussed infra Part IV.A. Admittedly, there is a bit of an apples-to-oranges element
in this analysis. As will be discussed below, some states explicitly include in their
calculations proven lost wages, while others do not. And some include post-release
damages, while most do not. I have included the total of each award, regardless of
remedial category, in my cost figures. Those costs do not, then, reflect compensation
only for the loss of liberty while incarcerated. This means that the average paid per lost
year amount in Column Q is overstated in those states. See infra Table 1.
139. Poverty Guidelines: U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to Determine Financial Eligibility for Certain Federal Programs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
OFF. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/povertyguidelines (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ($24,600 is the poverty line for a family of four);
Real Median Household Income in the United States, FRED ECON. DATA,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N (last updated Sept. 13, 2016)
($56,516 is the median household income for 2015). Do note that these figures concern
only state statutory compensation and do not consider any additional judgments or settlements in federal civil rights or tort claims.
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variations among states; the fortuity of one’s state of wrongful conviction
makes an enormous difference.
Further, comparing the costs of these statutes with state corrections budgets is illuminating. Determining the cost of incarcerating individuals in the
United States is an extremely difficult exercise and requires an analysis of more
than just each state’s published corrections budget. The Vera Institute of Justice attempted to do that in 2012.140 In its study, researchers obtained data from
forty participating states and found that the actual price to taxpayers in those
states of incarceration was $39 billion in fiscal year 2010.141
Similarly, in July 2014, the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics published its Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts for 2010.142
Looking only at state direct and capital outlay expenditures, thereby excluding
the very substantial expenditures by local and municipal governments and the
costs found by the Vera Institute to be excluded from budgets, the total expenditures by states on corrections in 2010 was just over $46 billion.143 Taking my
annual cost estimate and dividing it by the most recent 2010 corrections statistics, the cost of compensating the wrongly convicted under state statutes is between 0.03% and 0.035% of corrections expenditures.
This is true on a state level as well. Let’s take as an example Ohio, a
reasonably generous state with a relatively low number of non-filers, few premature claims, few pending claims, and a high percentage of claims awarded.
Ohio’s statute conveniently dates to 1989, and the state maintains comprehensive claims data. I have high confidence in my cost calculation of $21.3 million
spent on Ohio statutory compensation, or an average of $760,986 per year. By
comparison, the budget for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for fiscal year 2016 is $1,666,729,709.144 The annual cost of compensating
Ohio’s wrongly convicted is 0.0457% of its corrections budget.
Naturally, in time, some claimants with premature claims will file and be
awarded compensation, and some pending claims will be granted as well. It is
also true that, if nothing were to change, the annual costs of these statutes
would likely increase over time. One can reasonably project into the future

140. Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, VERA INST. JUST. (Jan. 2012), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf (last updated July 20, 2012).
141. Id. at 6.
142. Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2010 –
Final, BUREAU JUST. STATS. (July 1, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5049.
143. It is true that the costs of exoneration statutes apply only to those states that
have them. It is fair to compare total state corrections expenditures of all states because
the costs to states without compensation statutes was $0. Henrichson & Delaney, supra
note 140.
144. OHIO
DEP’T
REHABILITATION
&
CORRECTION
(July
2016),
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MX_xCeS-dYE%3D&portalid=0.
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that a higher percentage of claims will be filed in states that have adopted statutes since 1989. The number of exonerees each year has also generally risen
over time.145 But, these statistics make it very difficult to take seriously any
argument that, viewed as a whole, these statutes are as good as we can do.
The disappointment expressed in academic and popular literature about
these statutes is typically that too few states have them, that some exonerees in
states with statutes are denied compensation, and that, for some, the award
takes too long to receive. These are legitimate concerns, but the data also show
that the vast majority of exonerees were convicted in states that today have a
statute and that over 75% of applicants receive an award. Instead, perhaps
more telling is the finding that only about one-third of incarcerated exonerees
were compensated, and they received, on average, less than $27,000 per year
of incarceration.146 Those figures should be the source of greater dissatisfaction with state wrongful compensation statutes. They should also provide the
basis for a belief that there is room to make considerable progress.

C. The Efficiency of State Compensation Statutes
By efficiency, I do not mean the amount of time required between exoneration and compensation, although that would be an important measure of
evaluation. Instead, I refer to percentage of incarcerated exonerees who received a state statutory award. As noted, that figure is astonishingly low, only
34.66%. Two calculations form the basis of that finding – the percentage of
incarcerated exonerees who seek compensation (state statutes generally require
claimants to either file complaints in court or claims with a designated administrative entity to obtain compensation) and the percentage of filers who are
denied compensation.147
Why about 38% of exoneerees in states with statutes do not file likely
depends on a number of factors, some of which are unique to the state in question. First, some states impose statutory barriers that preclude claims; removal
of them may yield more awards. Florida and Missouri, for example, have high
non-filing rates. Florida’s high non-filing percentage is likely due in large part
to a unique statutory bar on compensation for persons who committed a felony
prior their wrongful conviction.148 Missouri permits compensation only for
those exonerated by DNA evidence.149 Maryland and Tennessee also have
145. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. The number of DNA exonerations, however, has generally leveled off. Id. State claims arising from DNA exoneration are quite possibly the most likely claims granted because the showing of factual
innocence is generally quite clear.
146. This figure is obtained by dividing the total cost by the years lost by exonerees
convicted in states with statutes today.
147. For a brief discussion of the latter point, see supra note 128.
148. See supra note 8.
149. Of 37 Missouri exonerations, only 13 involved DNA and, of those, only 9 are
on the Innocence Project’s list of DNA exonerees. See INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#missouri,exonerated-by-dna (last visited
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high non-filing rates. In those states, as in Maine, compensation is permitted
only if the governor issues a pardon.150 Iowa, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Ohio,
and, in certain cases, Virginia, preclude those who pled guilty from receiving
compensation, even if that plea was coerced.151
Second, at least some non-filing could be related to ungenerous statutes.
Montana grants qualifying exonerees only tuition remission, and no Montana
exoneree has sought it.152 Wisconsin awards a maximum of $25,000, regardless of the length of incarceration.153 Both have high non-filing rates. In contrast, those states that have or had uncapped statutes (except Maryland), and
thus relatively high awards (Connecticut, District of Columbia, New York, and
West Virginia), have comparatively low non-filing rates.154
Third, 22 states have adopted statutes since 1989.155 Half explicitly permit those exonerated prior to the passage of the statute to file for compensation,
but the statutes of the other half are silent on the point. Of those, most appeared
nevertheless to approve claims for persons exonerated before the adoption of
the statute. There were no retroactive claims filed in Minnesota and Utah. That
might explain some non-filing in those states. But, non-filing by those exonerated prior to the adoption of a state statute may more realistically be explained for other reasons: they did not learn about these statutes, had passed
away, were in prison for other crimes (which can be disqualifying), or simply
chose not to pursue compensation. As a result, it may not be surprising that
states with quite recent and comparatively progressive statutes, like Colorado,
Minnesota, and Washington, have high non-filing rates. One would reasonably
expect those to drop over time.
Fourth, although this is not a state-specific issue, a significant number of
non-filers spent relatively little time in prison. The Registry calculates the
number of years lost in incarceration by those exonerated in each state.156 The
national average is 8.7 years, but of the 576 non-filers, 155 were incarcerated
Apr. 26, 2017). The other 4 are not because “post-conviction DNA evidence was not
central to establishing innocence, and other non-DNA factors were essential to the exoneration.” COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
150. See supra note 8.
151. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 2017); see also Rhoades v. State, 880
N.W.2d 431, 450 (Iowa 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2) (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (West
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10 (2017). Of 8 non-filers in Iowa, 5 entered guilty
pleas. Four of 27 New Jersey exonerees pled guilty. No exoneree from Oklahoma pled
guilty. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
152. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (West 2017).
153. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2017).
154. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2423 (West 2017); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2017); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 142-13a (West 2017).
155. See Norris, supra note 99, at 298 fig.16.2 (tracing growth statutes from 1989
to 2009).
156. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
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for less than 1 year.157 The majority, 81, were wrongly convicted in Texas for
minor drug violations. For this population, filing a claim may promise little
benefit, particularly in relatively ungenerous states without attorneys’ fees provisions and with a requirement to seek compensation judicially, rather than administratively.
While more research is required to isolate the causes of non-filing in other
states lacking obviously plausible explanations, it is difficult to explain why
the filing rate is quite high in other states. Louisiana and Mississippi, for example, have the two lowest non-filing rates. Indeed, the procedures to obtain
compensation in those states are not particularly user friendly; nor are they especially generous. It is possible that the legal culture in certain states, supported by networks of criminal and civil attorneys experienced in wrongful
conviction matters, and possibly aided by an active Innocence Project and robust media attention to wrongful convictions, can explain why the non-filing
rate is lower in some states than others. The fact remains, though, that fewer
than 35% of exonerees in states with statutes obtain compensation. In Part V,
below, I offer several proposals that, if adopted, could increase that number.

IV. THE QUALITY OF STATE COMPENSATION RELIEF PROVISIONS
An exploration of the number of claims filers and how many receive compensation under state wrongful conviction compensation statutes says nothing
about the quality of those statutes or whether they contain any of the four characteristics that should be used to evaluate that quality: (1) financial adequacy,
(2) non-monetary social and other services, (3) choice, and (4) opportunity for
expedited resolution. An examination of the approaches states have taken on
these issues reveals that most fall far short of satisfying these features.

A. Financial Adequacy
1. What is Fair?
Establishing an appropriate level of monetary compensation for the
wrongly convicted is a profoundly difficult exercise. One federal judge resorted to a Broadway musical to pose the question:
The Court is reminded of the well-known lyrics from Rent:
Five hundred twenty-five thousand six hundred minutes
How do you measure, measure a year?
In daylights, in sunsets, in midnights, in cups of coffee

157. See id.
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In inches, in miles, in laughter, in strife
In five hundred twenty-five thousand six hundred minutes
How do you measure a year in the life?

158

The exercise, however, is hardly unprecedented. Congress, for example, recently passed legislation authorizing $10,000 of compensation per day for the
former Iranian hostages, and that metric had been established in the District of
Columbia in hostage litigation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.159
In this context, judges and juries throughout the country have been required to assess appropriate monetary damages in wrongful conviction cases
brought under federal civil rights theories and in states with uncapped statutory
compensation provisions. Recent jury verdicts in civil rights cases routinely
approach or exceed $1 million per year of incarceration.160 Newton v. City of

158. Singletary v. District of Columbia, 876 F. Supp. 2d 106, 109 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting JONATHAN LARSON, Seasons of Love, on RENT (Verve 1996)), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 766 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
159. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015) (codified in scattered sections of 1 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 5 U.S.C.A., 7
U.S.C.A., 10 U.S.C.A., 15 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A., 20 U.S.C.A., 21 U.S.C.A., 33
U.S.C.A., 41 U.S.C.A., 42 U.S.C.A., 51 U.S.C.A.). See generally Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West 2017). See, e.g., Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2015) (using $10,000 per day of confinement metric and citing prior cases using same metric).
160. The following is a fairly comprehensive listing of judgments issued after January 1, 2010, excluding those in the D.C. cases: Spencer v. Peters, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8712, at *3–4 (9th Cir. May 18, 2017) (reinstating $9 million verdict for man
incarcerated 19.6 years); Patrick v. City of Chicago, Civ. No. 14-cv-3658 (N.D. Ill.);
Jason Meisner, Jury Awards $13.4 Million to Man Wrongly Imprisoned for Decades
for Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2017, 8:02 PM) (jury award of $13,390,000 for 18.8
years of wrongful incarceration; $712,000 per year); Fields v. City of Chicago, No. 10
C 1168, 2012 WL 6705419 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 2012); Jason Meisner & Elyssa Cherney,
Jury Awards $22 Million in Damages to Wrongly Convicted Ex-El Rukn, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec. 15, 2016, 8:27 PM) ($22 million for 18 years of incarceration); Dean v. Cty. of
Gage, 807 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Gage Cty. v. Dean, 136 S.
Ct. 2490 (2016); Chris Dunker, Taxpayers, Not Insurance, to Pay for Gage County
Mistake, LINCOLN J. STAR (July 6, 2016), http://journalstar.com/news/local/taxpayersnot-insurance-to-pay-for-gage-county-mistake/article_bcd4bfd1-245b-5cb9-a94602a547a4c91a.html (total award of $28.1 million to 6 people, ranging from $350,000
to $456,000 per year); Peacock v. City of Rochester, No. 6:13-cv-6046-MAT, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *9–13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016) (awarding $5 million for
a man unjustly incarcerated for rape for 5 years, 9 months, and 21 days, plus $750,000
in post-release damages and lost wages); Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, Civ. No. 0708150 (S.D.N.Y.); Albert Samaha, Jury Awards Upstate Man $41 Million for 16-Year
Wrongful Imprisonment, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 24, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/2014/10/24/jury-awards-upstate-man-41-million-for-16-year-wrong-
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New York161 offers an interesting recent example. In 1985, Alan Newton was
convicted of 2 rapes and sentenced to 2 consecutive terms of imprisonment; he
served 10 years for the first and 12 years for the second rape.162 After New
York passed legislation entitling defendants to request DNA samples after conviction, Newton filed such a request for the second rape, but the rape kit associated with it could not be found.163 Many years later, it was located, and the
forensic testing exonerated Newton for the second crime.164 He filed and won
a federal civil rights claim based on the city’s failure to timely locate the rape
kit.165
With respect to damages, Newton testified that he had not suffered physical injuries while incarcerated, that he sought no psychological treatment for
depression after release, and that the 12 years of wrongful incarceration were

ful-imprisonment/ (2015 verdict of $40 million for 16.5 years of wrongful incarceration, plus $1.65 million lost wages, or approximately $2.4 million per year); Restivo v.
Nassau Cty., No. 06-CV-6720(JS)(SIL), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160336, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015) (2014 verdict of $36 million to 2 plaintiffs who each spent
18 years wrongly imprisoned, or $1 million per year); Ayers v. City of Cleveland, No.
1:12-CV-00753, 2014 WL 2042254, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2014) ($13.2 million jury
verdict for 12 years’ wrongful imprisonment), aff’d, 773 F.3d 161 (6th Cir. 2014);
Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming § 1983 jury
verdict of $25 million for 16 years of wrongful incarceration, or $1.5 million per year);
Spadaro v. City of Miramar, No. 11-61607-CIV, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135646, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2013), aff’d, 591 Fed. App’x 906 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding $7
million verdict for man incarcerated over 25 years); Slevin v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Cty.
of Doña Ana, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274–78 (D.N.M. 2012) (holding $15.5 million
compensatory damages verdict for 22 months in wrongful solitary confinement –
$500,000 per month of confinement plus $1 million per year since release – was not
excessive given evidence at trial); Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F. Supp. 2d 405, 426–27
(D. Mass. 2011) (denying remittitur for $14 million jury award for 14 years of wrongful
imprisonment), vacated on other grounds, 707 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013); White v.
McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 539 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming § 1983 jury verdict of $14
million compensatory damages for 5.5 years’ wrongful incarceration, or $2.5 million
per year); Newton v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 140, 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2015) (reinstating 2010 jury verdict of $18 million for 12 years’ wrongful incarceration, about $1.5
million per year), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016), remittitur granted, 171 F. Supp.
3d 156, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (remitted to $1 million per year). Of the pre-2010 cases,
perhaps the most influential has been Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 103–07
(1st Cir. 2009), which affirmed as not excessive a $96 million wrongful conviction
judicial verdict split among 4 plaintiffs – based on $1 million per year baseline. See
also Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007) (underlying district court opinion setting damage amount, discussing wrongful conviction
awards).
161. Newton, 171 F. Supp. 3d 156.
162. Id. at 160–61.
163. See id. at 160.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 161.
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similar to those of the first 10 in which he was properly incarcerated.166 He did
not seek economic damages.167 The jury, not told of this lawful conviction,
awarded him $18 million, or $1.5 million per year of wrongful imprisonment.168 Ultimately, the city filed a motion for remittitur and was required to
show that the verdict was “so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice.”169
That standard required comparing the outcome with other wrongful conviction cases.170 To do that, the court held that it would not consider settlements because they “implicate compromise.”171 After discussing the remaining competing cases cited by both parties, the court granted the remittitur.172
The court’s rationale turned on distinguishing cases, in New York and elsewhere, cited by Newton that awarded more than $1 million per year of incarceration.173 Those cases involved the wrongful incarceration of youths, situations in which the incarceration was solely for crimes not committed, cases in
which the plaintiff was physically abused, plaintiffs with ongoing mental
health problems, and instances where post-release damages may have affected
the jury’s valuation of harm.174 The key point here is not that the court granted
the motion, but that the court’s “survey of other similar cases provide[d] further
indication that an award of one million dollars per year of incarceration constitutes the upper boundary for a reasonable award under the circumstances presented by this case.”175 Put differently, $1 million per year of incarceration is
now the reasonable top “going rate,” subject to enhancement in particular circumstances.176

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.
See id. at 161 n.11.
See id. at 162.
Id. at 165 (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 1998)).
As a result of a prior appeal and other delays, the city’s motion was actually
filed over 5 years prior to the court’s ruling on the motion, but the court held that it
could consider post-briefing cases in deciding the motion. See id. at 172.
171. Id. at 172 n.98 (quoting Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 104 (1st Cir.
2009)).
172. See id. at 177.
173. See id. at 172–77.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 174.
176. The court compared the Newton verdict with the $25 million verdict awarded
to Jeffrey Deskovic, who was wrongly incarcerated for seventeen years for a rape-murder, distinguishing it on the ground that Deskovic was very young (convicted at age
16), as well as both the “level of governmental misconduct involved, and media attention it received.” See id. at 175 n.118. Factors relevant to the calculus are the nature
of the crime for which the individual was unjustly convicted (sex offenses being the
most stigmatizing and likely to result in prison violence), Peacock v. City of Rochester,
No. 6:13-cv-6046, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016);
Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *10–
11 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015), and whether the individual had previous experience
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The substantially lower Odom and Tribble judgments, issued by two different D.C. Superior Court judges sitting without juries, offer additional insight
into the valuation decision-making process. Neither judge explained how or
why he arrived at the particular $1000 per day or $400,000 per year metric
applied in Odom and Tribble, respectively. Neither compared the facts of these
cases to others. Their lengthy and detailed findings were, however, issued
months after trial and reflect the time, thought, and care they brought to perform their “solemn charge.”177
Most important, both were guided by the D.C. City Council’s intent to
fully compensate the unjustly incarcerated. Their findings of fact make two
things very clear: (1) assessment is highly individualized, and (2) assessment
involves consideration of a wide range of damages and harms experienced in
prison and afterwards. The findings in these cases view the loss of freedom
not merely one-dimensionally in terms of years, but in a specific context that
accounts for separation from family, friends, and children and the loss of personal promise. The judges found relevant the brutality, desperation, conditions, and fear inherent in prison life, the psychological impact of wrongful
imprisonment, and the specific medical consequences of incarceration, as each
was particularly experienced by the plaintiff.178 Put differently, the judges in
Odom and Tribble did not decide upon a universally appropriate value of a day
or year lost. They instead assigned a value based for the actual harms, pain,
and suffering experienced by the plaintiffs.

2. What Actually Happens
All but 5 state compensation statutes, however, take an entirely different
approach. They either prescribe an unalterable daily or annual amount or impose modest compensation caps, or do both. I place these statutes in 3 basic
categories.179 Category 1 statutes prescribe a daily or annual amount of compensation during incarceration without an overall compensation cap.180 Cate-

in the criminal justice system, including prior incarcerations. See Peacock, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10354, at *6.
177. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *54.
178. See id. at *54–56; see also Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *58–62 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016).
179. Montana is excluded because it offers only tuition benefits and no financial
compensation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (West 2017).
180. Missouri ($50 per day of incarceration = $18,250 per year), MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 650.058.1 (West 2017); Virginia (90% of per capita state income = $46,922.40 per
year), VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (West 2017); Michigan ($50,000 per year of incarceration), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1755(2)(a) (West 2017); Washington
($50,000 per year; $100,000 per year if sentenced to death),WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.100.060(5)(a) (West 2017); New Jersey (two times prior income or $50,000 per year,
whichever is higher), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5 (West 2017); California ($140 per day
of incarceration = $51,110 per year), CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2017); Ohio
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gory 2 statutes prescribe a daily or annual amount of compensation during incarceration with an overall compensation cap.181 Category 3 statutes impose a
general overall cap on damages.182
States with prescribed daily or annual non-economic damage amounts
(Categories 1 and 2) depersonalize the compensation question by presuming
that all wrongly incarcerated persons suffer equally. For these states, all that
matters is the number of years of incarceration. Individual facts and circumstances are irrelevant, and the narratives of exonerees in these states go unheard. State statutes with both prescribed awards and caps additionally penalize those incarcerated the longest. Those incarcerated for lengthy terms are
effectively given no compensation for the later years of prison, reducing their
average annual awards.183
States with overall caps (Category 3) are similarly unfair to those incarcerated the longest. To the extent that the state awards at or near the cap, the
rate of annual compensation for those incarcerated for very lengthy periods
($52,625.18 per year and lost wages, inflation adjusted), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2743.49 (West 2017); Colorado ($70,000 per year of incarceration; $120,000 per year
if sentenced to death), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103 (West 2017); Texas
($80,000 per year of incarceration), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052
(West 2017). Vermont and Connecticut prescribe ranges: $30-60,000 per year and lost
wages, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (West 2017), and $71,346-$142,692 per year,
which is between one and two times Connecticut’s gross household income, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2017).
181. Wisconsin ($5000 per year with $25,000 total cap), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05
(West 2017); Utah ($42,180 (the Utah nonagricultrual annual wage) per year; 15-year
cap), UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (West 2017); Mississippi ($50,000 per year;
$500,000 cap), MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (West 2017); North Carolina ($50,000 per
year; $750,000 cap), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84 (West 2017); Florida ($50,000
per year; $2 million overall cap), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06 (West 2017). Iowa varies
slightly with a prescribed award of $50 per day and a cap of $25,000 per year in lost
wages. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 2017). Louisiana prescribes $25,000 per
year capped at $250,000, plus up to $80,000 for loss of life opportunities. LA. STAT.
ANN. §15:572.8 (West 2017).
182. New Hampshire (cap of $20,000), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2017);
Illinois (0-5 years of incarceration cap is $94,600; 5-14 years = $188,423; 14+ years =
$ 230,732) (inflation adjusted 2016 figures), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (West
2017); Oklahoma (cap of $175,000), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West 2017);
Maine (cap of $300,000), ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 8242 (2017); Massachusetts (cap of
$500,000, including services and tuition), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5 (West
2017); Nebraska (cap of $500,000), NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4604 (West 2017);
Tennessee (cap of $1,000,000), TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (West 2017).
183. For example, Mississippi, which awards $50,000 per year and imposes a
$500,000 cap, effectively stops compensation at the end of 10 years. MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-44-7. Of 16 Mississippi exonerees, 9 were incarcerated for 10 years or longer.
COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. North Carolina awards $50,000 per year
of incarceration, capped at $750,000. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84. Of the 58 incarcerated exonerees in North Carolina, 20 served more than 15 years. COMPLETE
NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
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may be less than those incarcerated for less time.184 Illinois, with the thirdhighest number of exonerees on the Registry, which oddly provides capped
amounts for 0-5 years, 5-14 years, and over 14 years of incarceration, offers an
excellent example.185 One 2010 exoneree received $85,350 for a 1.2-year
wrongful incarceration, which exceeds $70,000 per year.186 Another man exonerated the same year after 23.1 years of wrongful imprisonment was awarded
$199,500, or just over $8600 per year. Both received the maximum amount
permitted for their durations of imprisonment.187 States with compensation
caps produce unjustifiable inequalities among exonerees within the state.

3. Promising Alternatives?
Only 3 states – Alabama, Connecticut, and Hawaii – provide for a specific
damage floor and afford claimants an opportunity to seek additional monetary
compensation based on particular individual circumstances.188 In theory, these
states would allow the claimant to demonstrate that particular harms they experienced justify an enhanced compensatory award. This would allow for an
element of individualized decisionmaking similar to that offered in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, described below. So far, however,
they are not promising.
Hawaii’s statute, which imposes a floor of $50,000 per year and an enhancement cap of $100,000, was enacted in 2016 and remains untested.189
There have been, moreover, only three exonerations in Hawaii since 1989.190
Connecticut, which permits an award between one and two times the state median household income, allows the Claims Commissioner to award an additional 25% based on statutory factors.191 That statute, amended in 2016 as described, retreats from Connecticut’s previous uncapped provision and is also
untested.
Alabama’s statute merits closer attention because of its longer history and
the greater number of exonerees in the state. It sets a $50,000-per-year-of184. In Massachusetts, the overall cap is $500,000, including the value of services
and the tuition discount. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5. The average wrongful
incarceration in Massachusetts is 10.9 years. See COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra
note 107. That caps the annual recovery for an average exoneree at less than $50,000
per year. Twenty-two of 48 incarcerated exonerees in Massachusetts served more than
10 years. Id.
185. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8.
186. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
187. Id.
188. In Hawaii, the claimant may seek additional compensation in “extraordinary
circumstances.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-3(c)(3) (West 2017). See ALA. CODE
§ 29-2-159 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 661B-3(c)(3).
189. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-3(c)(3).
190. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
191. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu.
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imprisonment floor and an uncapped potential enhancement.192 However, my
review of each claim filed under Alabama’s statute193 reveals that in only one
case was a claimant awarded more than the presumptive amount, and the increase was for litigation costs, not extraordinary non-economic damages. At
the same time, it does not appear that the claimants in the other cases had ever
actually requested an evidentiary hearing to support a petition for an enhanced
award.
While it is premature to evaluate Connecticut and Hawaii, it is uncertain
whether the adoption in other states of Alabama’s intriguing floor-plus-uncapped-enhancement approach will work in practice. Perhaps a concern in Alabama is the potential delay in compensation inherent in proceeding before the
Committee and, if it grants supplemental compensation, waiting for state legislative review. That cumbersome procedure would provide a disincentive to
seeking enhanced compensation. Much better would be a process in which the
base compensation amount is paid pending Committee and legislative review
of a request for additional compensation.
Just four states (Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia) and
the District of Columbia194 permit the exonerated claimant to seek full, tortbased compensatory relief. The results are widely variant and summarized in
Table 1. In Maryland, for example,195 the Board of Public Works makes compensation awards, and state law requires claimants to have been pardoned by
the governor. Only 3 of 23 incarcerated Maryland exonerees on the Registry
have been awarded compensation; the present value of those awards is $91 or
$92 per day, less than one-tenth of that awarded by judges in the neighboring
District of Columbia.196 As Table 1 shows, awards in the remaining uncapped
states are considerably higher, but none except Minnesota offer reentry support
and services.

192. ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-159(a)–(b).
193. Alabama has created a 9-person Committee on Compensation for Wrongful

Incarceration, which consists primarily of high-ranking members of the state legislature
or their designees. Id. §§ 29-2-151, 152. A claimant asserting eligibility for compensation submits an application to the state’s Division of Risk Management. Id. § 29-2158(a). If the Division finds the claimant eligible, the Committee has 90 days to certify
an award. Id. § 29-2-158(b). The presumptive amount is $50,000 per year of incarceration. Id. § 29-2-159(a). However, a claimant may request additional compensation.
Id. § 29-2-159(b). If so, the Committee will convene a hearing and invite the attorney
general and appropriate district attorney to attend and refute the claimant’s evidence.
Id. § 29-2-159(c). If the committee makes a presumptive or supplemental award, it
does so in the form of a recommended bill presented to the state legislature. Id.
194. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-423 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC.
§ 10-501 (West 2017); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2017); W. Vᴀ. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-13a (West 2017).
195. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501. Information from the Maryland Board of Public Works is on file with the author.
196. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
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Minnesota’s statute, enacted in 2014, deserves close attention because it
adopts an innovative approach that rebalances state exposure and fair compensation by capping certain forms of damages but not others. Claims are decided
by a 3-person compensation panel appointed by the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.197 The panel is required to consider the following elements of damages: (1) economic damages, including attorneys’ fees, lost
wages, and costs of criminal defense; (2) reimbursement for medical and dental
expenses already incurred and future unpaid expenses causally related to the
wrongful imprisonment; (3) non-economic damages; (4) tuition benefits; (5)
reimbursement for paid or unpaid child support payments; and (6) reimbursement for paid or unpaid reintegrative expenses.198 Elements 2 and 3 are uncapped, while elements 1 and 4 through 6 are capped at $100,000 per year of
incarceration.199 The statute sets a floor: $50,000 per year of incarceration and
$25,000 for each year on supervised release or as a registered predatory offender.200 The Minnesota statute requires the legislature to approve awards
made by the compensation panel.201
So far, the results in Minnesota are encouraging. A legislative subcommittee has approved awards to 3 exonerated Minnesota men who were wrongfully imprisoned for 2, 3.1, and 5.5 years.202 They sought and are expected to
receive a total of $1,787,000, or an average of nearly $170,000 per year. However, Minnesota’s novel statute has not been replicated beyond that state, where
only 11 people have been exonerated since 1989.

4. The Reality: Partial Compensation
It is clear that all of the states with prescribed limits or overall caps compensate far less than recent jury awards in civil rights cases or judgments in
uncapped states.203 This is not an accident. Many of the more recent state caps
are keyed to the $50,000 per-year metric contained in the 2004 amendment to
the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute.204 That $50,000 annual
cap did not, however, reflect Congress’s judgment that such an amount fully
compensates those wrongly convicted. Indeed, the Senate report specifically
noted that the $50,000 cap was less than initially proposed and less than many
members wished.205 It was a compromise reflecting a realization that it did not
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.363 (West 2017).
Id. § 611.365, subdivs. 2(1)–(6).
Id. § 611.365, subdiv. 3.
Id. § 611.365, subdiv. 2.
Id. § 611.367.
Matt Sepic, Minn. Panel Approves Payment of $1.8M to Three Freed After
NEWS
(Apr.
13,
2016),
Wrongful
Convictions,
MPR
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/04/13/payments-to-wrongfully-convicted.
203. Newton v. City of New York, 171 F. Supp. 3d 156, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2012).
205. PATRICK LEAHY, THE INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, S. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 107315, at 37 (2002).
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represent full compensation for damages but instead was “the “very least that
the Congress should do.”206
Some states with caps similarly acknowledge that the limit does not reflect a legislative judgment that it is fully compensatory. California, for example, made this quite clear. In its legislative findings, the California legislature
expressed its intent to “remedy some of the harm caused to . . . factually innocent people.”207 Moreover, in challenging as excessive an award of $1 million
per year of unjust imprisonment in a Federal Tort Claims Act case,208 the
United States pointed to § 2513 and state statutes with much smaller annual
caps as evidence of more appropriate benchmarks for damages. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected that challenge and upheld the judgment, holding that the state and federal caps “do not purport to measure the
harm actually inflicted by wrongful incarceration; rather, each reflects a legislative choice to limit the sovereign’s liability.”209 These caps are simply a partial waiver of sovereign immunity.210
It is plain, then, that the vast majority of state statutes are not fully compensatory and are not intended to be. By pegging compensation at a particular
rate, multiplied by years of incarceration, or by imposing very low caps, they
have no place for the careful and detailed individualized inquiries made in
Odom and Tribble. It is not simply that these statutes are insufficiently compensatory; most have no mechanism to account for the particular damages and
harms experienced by individual exonerees.
Moreover, those state statutes that center on per-day and per-year incarceration metrics are temporally limited. On the front end, only 4 states permit
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
2009 Cal. Stat. ch. 432, § 1 (emphasis added).
Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id. at 105.
In Singletary v. District of Columbia, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit against
the District of Columbia, claiming that the D.C. Parole Board violated his right to due
process when, without evidentiary support, it revoked his parole, resulting in Mr. Singletary’s incarceration for an additional ten years. 876 F. Supp. 2d 106, 107 (D.D.C.
2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 766 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1565 (2015). The jury awarded him $2.3 million, and the District of
Columbia argued that the verdict was excessive, pointing to 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e), arguing, in effect, that $50,000 per year is adequate and anything more is excessive. Id. at
108–10. The court pointed out the false comparison:
But what the legislature has determined that the government would be willing
to pay to resolve a wrongful incarceration claim does not impose any sort of
ceiling on what a jury can fairly decide. Here, the jury – which heard all the
evidence in the case and assessed the credibility of the witnesses, including the
plaintiff – determined that an amount of money greater than what was contemplated in that statute was necessary to compensate plaintiff for the particular
harm he experienced.

Id. at 110.
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compensation for pre-trial incarceration.211 On the back end, only 4 states explicitly recognize that the harms suffered by exonerees do not end on the day
of release.212 The statutes in those states authorize compensation for post-release time spent on parole, probation, or a sex offender list.213 No capped state
statute provides for post-parole or post-probation damages or for post-release
damages experienced by those never placed on parole, placed on probation, or
required to register as a sex offender.
In addition, most state statutes overlook the significant economic costs
associated with wrongful conviction. The most significant of these is lost
wages. Only Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, and Vermont have explicit
lost wage provisions.214 New Jersey keys its cap to twice the annual lost wages
or $50,000 per year, whichever is higher.215 Only 4 states contemplate the
award of unpaid child support accrued during the wrongful incarceration.216
Six states permit the reimbursement of court costs, penalties, fees, expenses, or
attorneys’ fees arising from the underlying criminal case and/or post-conviction litigation.217
Yet, there are signs of progress. The relatively new statutes in states like
Washington, Colorado, Texas, and Minnesota, while adopting aspects of prescribed awards and caps keyed to incarceration time, break free of the traditional mold that adheres only to those metrics. These statutes reflect a more
thoughtful approach to compensation, which more comprehensively accounts
211. ALA. CODE § 29-2-156(2) (2017) (pre-trial detainees on state felony charges
for at least 2 years are eligible); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 611B-3(a)(3) (West 2017)
(permits compensation for pre-trial detention in cases of conviction); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 148-84(a) (West 2017) (compensation includes time spent awaiting trial);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(5)(a) (West 2017) (compensation includes time
waiting for trial if convicted). These cases explicitly provide for compensation for pretrial detention under certain circumstances. Cf. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(a)
(West 2017) (no compensation for pre-indictment detention).
212. Colorado, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington.
213. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(3)(a)(II) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 590.11 (West 2017); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(b) (West 2017);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(5)(a). No state statute explicitly provides for postparole or post-probation damages.
214. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(a)(2) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. §
663A.1(6)(c) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.11 subdiv. 2(1); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(c) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(b)(1) (West
2017).
215. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(b) (West 2017).
216. Only Colorado, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington do so at present. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(e)(II); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.11; TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(5)(c).
217. Only Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington generally do
so. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-65-103(2)(e)(iv), (v); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
961.06(1)(c), (d) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.6(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 5574(b)(1). Nebraska will extinguish liens imposed to recover costs of state-provided
criminal defense. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4605 (West 2017).
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for the duration of damages and the types of economic harms that the wrongfully exonerated have experienced. As will be discussed in Part V, aspects of
these statutes serve as useful models for a reconceived approach to the compensation of the wrongfully convicted.

B. The Needs of the Exonerated
There can be no doubt that many of the exonerated have significant health
care, social service, job training and employment, and other needs.218 But,
there is no reason to think that those needs are the same or equally pressing for
all. While many, like our client Donald Gates, were exonerated while in prison
and thus released, many others, like our remaining clients, were exonerated
post-release. This is not to say that they had no need for services, but rather,
that their needs for certain services were less pressing than those who, often
without significant warning, suddenly find themselves released after a lengthy
incarceration.
A fair number of states219 recognize the social service needs of the exonerated and thus offer elements of this form of restorative justice in their statutes,220 although few offer a comprehensive set of them. Several states, with
some limitations, offer the following services: (1) educational benefits, such as

218. See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, Making Up for Lost Time, supra note 13;
Robert J. Norris, Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted, 23
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 352, 355–57 (2012). See also Armbrust, supra note 11, at 170–
82 (advocating for “holistic” state compensation statutes that provide services and medical insurance in addition to money); Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael Aufgang, Beyond
Monetary Compensation: The Need for Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully
Convicted, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105 (2008) (same). Relying on psychological
literature, Chinn and Ratliff detail the profound trauma experienced following release
of those wrongfully convicted and argue that the exonerated should be offered transitional services. Chinn & Ratliff, supra note 55, at 415–18, 422–39, 442–43.
219. Of the 33 states (including the District of Columbia), with compensation statutes, 15 offer no services at all (Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, and West Virginia). The Nebraska statute oddly provides that it does not
preclude the provision of services but does not require them. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
29-4606. Costs of such services are deducted from the award. Id.
220. For a discussion of restorative justice in this context, see Cathleen Burnett,
Restorative Justice and Wrongful Capital Convictions: A Simple Proposal, 21 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 272, 280–86 (2005).
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free or reduced cost tuition at state public educational institutions;221 (2) employment training;222 (3) job search and placement;223 (4) medical and counseling services;224 and (5) reentry or reintegration services.225 Whether they
are actually sought and provided is much more difficult to determine.
Here again, Minnesota’s statute is particularly thoughtful and comprehensive. It requires the panel awarding compensation to consider: (1) reimbursement of medical and dental expenses and future unpaid expenses expected to
be incurred as a result of the wrongful imprisonment; (2) reimbursement for
tuition and fees for educational programs or employment skills and development training and future costs for education and training, up to the cost of a 4year public university; and (3) paid or unpaid reintegrative expenses “for immediate services secured by the claimant upon exoneration and release, including housing, transportation and subsistence, reintegrative services, and medical
and dental health care costs.”226
The Texas statute is also comparatively progressive and, as shown below,
can serve as a model for reform. It requires that the same programs available
for parolees be available to the wrongfully convicted.227 It also requires the
development of a comprehensive plan to ensure the “successful reentry and

221. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(e)(II) (Colorado awards tuition waivers at state colleges for the exonerated person and for his or her children conceived or
adopted prior to incarceration if the claimant was unjustly incarcerated for more than 3
years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(2)(c) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
961.06(1)(b); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2)(c)(i) (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(A) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.362, subdiv. 2(4); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(c)(2) (West
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(C) (West 2017) ($10,000 community college career or technical training reimbursement).
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(c)(1).
223. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1015/2 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. §
15:572.8(H)(2)(a) (job skills training for 3 years); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(c)(1)
(for at least 1 year).
224. LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2)(b) (for 6 years); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN.
& PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (West 2017) (Board of Public Works may “grant a reasonable
amount for any financial or other appropriate counseling”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
258D, § 5(A); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365, subdivs. 2(2), (6) (West 2017) (allows for
reimbursement for medical and reintegrative services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
5574(b)(2) (West 2017) (up to 10 years of health coverage equivalent to Medicaid).
225. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1710/125
(reentry services limited to assistance in obtaining mental health services); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611.365, subdiv. 2(6); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(b) (West 2017) (claimant
may be awarded other non-monetary relief, including vocational training, tuition assistance, counseling, housing assistance, and health insurance coverage); TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 501.101(b) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(b)(3); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(10) (West 2017) (claimant may seek referral to reentry
services; statute silent on who pays for services).
226. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365, subdiv. 2(6).
227. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.101(b).
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reintegration” of wrongfully imprisoned persons.228 That plan must include
life skills, job, and vocational training for as long as they are needed, assistance
in identifying needed documents, and financial assistance of up to $10,000 for
living expenses following the release from prison.229
These statutes reflect efforts to proactively identify and provide the assistance particular exonerees specifically require. They view the exonerated as
individuals with unique and personal needs that government programs can address, rather than as a depersonalized multiplication problem. The inclusion of
social services and other reentry support in new state compensation statutes is
the most significant improvement in these statutes over the last decade.

C. Expedited Consideration and Choice
The process that results in a state compensation award involves two steps:
(1) the post-conviction process aimed at obtaining a vacatur of the conviction,
dismissal of the indictment, and/or a certificate of actual innocence and (2) a
compensatory process in which a civil remedy is sought. Outside the scope of
this Article is the length of post-conviction relief procedures.230 Compensatory
delay can be devastating, particularly for those freed from prison with nothing
following post-conviction relief.231
The first potential cause of compensatory delay is essentially factual and
raises the question of whether the findings and conclusions made during the
post-conviction proceedings are given preclusive effect in the civil claim for
compensation. Our D.C. cases, for instance, involved unique questions about
the preclusive effect of facts recited in the certificates of innocence awarded at

228. Id. § 501.102(b).
229. Id.
230. A terrible practice, but one in which counsel in post-conviction relief proceed-

ings and compensation cases may face and manage jointly, are offers by the State to
concede post-conviction relief in exchange for an agreement to waive rights to civil
damages. Josh Saul, The Fairbanks Four’s Brutal Fight for Freedom, NEWSWEEK (Jan.
12, 2016, 5:39 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/01/22/alaska-fairbanks-fourand-how-murder-convictions-end-414201.html. Such was the case in for “Fairbanks
Four” in Alaska whose convictions were reversed in exchange for a waiver. Id.
231. See, e.g., Marie C. Baca, Wrongly Convicted Face Uphill Battle to Obtain
Compensation, CAL. WATCH (Mar. 5, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/publicsafety/wrongly-convicted-face-uphill-battle-obtain-compensation-9014
(California
process can take 2 years from filing to hearing); Glaun, supra note 122 (2 years is allowed for discovery in compensation cases); Ziva Branstetter, Few Exonerees Receive
Payment for Wrongful Convictions, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 23, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/newshomepage1/few-exonerees-receive-payment-forwrongful-convictions/article_0f8f4e61-ca52-57bf-a8c5-ad3014fe4003.html (last updated Apr. 23, 2016) (describing Nebraska man’s 10-year effort to receive compensation).
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the conclusion of post-conviction proceedings, during which federal prosecutors represented the interests of the District of Columbia.232 The second oftenlitigated issue concerns whether the exonerated claimant satisfies the statutory
prerequisites of the state compensation statute.233 As shown in Table 1, this
litigation or administrative adjudication is not uncommon – 109 claims by
claimants on the Registry were denied, and an unknown number surmounted
challenges to compensability.234 The third potential source of delay arises in
the process by which the amount of compensation for qualified exonerees is
set and ultimately awarded.235 Delay can follow when the statute fails to impose deadlines for the administrative processing of the award,236 when the administrative adjudication amounts to a recommendation to the state legislature

232. In the absence of statutory direction, this can involve some potentially tricky
issues. For instance, a county district attorney may agree that the former defendant is
factually innocent, but a stipulated order to that effect may not be binding on the separate governmental entity, the State, litigating the claim for compensation. This may
raise the questions whether the issue of factual innocence was “actually litigated” and
whether the State is in privity with the county, such that the State is deemed to have
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See Tennison v. Cal. Victim Comp.
& Gov’t Claims Bd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 95–101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing
preclusion question prior to statutory amendment). California, Illinois, and Ohio, for
example, resolve that issue by deeming declarations or certificates of factual innocence
binding on subsequent claims for damages. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.865 (West 2017);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702(j) (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2743.48(E)(1) (West 2017).
233. See supra note 128.
234. See infra Table 1.
235. The Minnesota statute offers a clear example of a bifurcated process. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 590.11 (West 2017), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Back v.
State, 883 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). In Minnesota, a claimant must first file
an action in court for an order declaring him or her eligible for compensation, to which
the prosecutor responds. Id. If granted, the claimant files a separate claim for compensation with the state supreme court. Id. § 611.362.
236. Twenty-five of the state statutes have no deadlines for the resolution of the
claim for compensation and subsequent award, if granted. Several contain tepid exhortations that the matter be resolved as soon as practical. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-65-02(6) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(1) (West 2017). In
New York, the matter must be given docket priority. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(2)
(McKinney 2017). Those with some specific deadlines generally do not impose time
frames covering each step of the process. In California, for example, the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board is required to calculate the amount of compensation within 30 days of presentation, and the attorney general may respond within
60 days to claims that were not based on a certificate of innocence or writ of habeas
corpus. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4902(a). However, the following hearing is scheduled at
the “earliest date convenient,” and no deadline is set for a decision or for legislative
review of any recommended payments. Id. § 4902(b). See also Pishko, supra note 2
(noting that the California Claims Board process “takes no less than [a] year, and often
much more than that”).
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to make a future payment,237 or when a civil lawsuit is required to obtain compensation.238 It took Kirk Odom 3 years from the filing of his complaint to
receive his compensation, and Santae Tribble waited even longer.
Given the state interest in ensuring that an exonerated individual meets
the requirements of the state compensation statute, devoting the time necessary
to make that determination is inevitable, particularly in cases raising real questions of qualification. The delay inherent in resolving questions of qualification, real or imagined, however, gives the state bargaining leverage in cases
that may be subject to settlement. That leverage can be very effective with
exonerees desperate for support.
Some states address this issue by requiring the state, represented by the
attorney general’s office or district attorney, to announce whether it will oppose
the claim on qualification grounds by a certain date.239 Opposed claims are
litigated judicially or administratively. Unopposed claims move on to a determination of compensation. Once that stage is reached, however, no state offers
the exoneree the choice to either receive a set of services and prescribed monetary award or to pursue litigation seeking more than that prescribed award.
As described below, that election of remedies concept would give the
qualifying exoneree a choice to trade compensation for speed. They should be
permitted to select a package of compensation and services to be provided
quickly or proceed to litigate the compensation question. For our clients, only
the latter option was available. But, as explored in the next section, the remedial frameworks of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund offer design features that
might fit in a more flexible state compensation scheme in a manner that can
benefit both the states and exonerees.

V. ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS PROCESSING MODELS
A. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
A small percentage of individuals who are administered a vaccine experience an adverse reaction to it. In the early 1980s, the number of lawsuits
237. ALA. CODE § 29-2-165(a) (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611.368; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(A) (West 2017). This problem has
been particularly acute recently in Illinois. See Lolly Bowean, Freed from Prison, but
Waiting Compensation as State Budget Fight Drags On, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2015, 5:00
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-exonerated-payouts-held-met20151009-story.html.
238. A 2007 New York Times analysis of claims that individuals filed on the Innocent Project’s listing of persons exonerated through DNA analysis found that over half
of those awarded compensation received it 2 or more years after exoneration. Janet
Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and Justice Is Slow
to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25dna.html.
239. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §661B-2(b) (West 2017).
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seeking compensation for such injuries grew, causing 2 of the 3 domestic vaccine manufacturers to exit the market.240 The supply of vaccines was threatened, rates of vaccinations dropped, and compensation for injury was slow and
difficult.241 Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986242 to replace the traditional tort system for this category of injury with the
intent to resolve this serious dilemma.
The Act created an adjudicatory process that largely preempted state tort
suits against vaccine manufacturers and healthcare providers.243 Petitioners are
required to file claims for damages in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.244
They are not required to demonstrate fault but must show causation. To facilitate the showing of causation in certain cases, a Vaccine Injury Table (“Table”) was developed.245 If a listed side effect is experienced within the time
periods following administration of particular vaccines set forth in the Table,
causation is presumed; it then becomes incumbent on the government to rebut
that presumption.246 A Special Master of the Court of Federal Claims decides
the claim within 240 days of filing,247 subject to time-restricted review by the
Court of Federal Claims.248
The statute compensates the injured petitioner fully for causally related
medical, social service, and other expenses, as well as lost wages.249 Injured
petitioners who prove causation are also entitled to compensation for pain and
suffering, but this category of damages is capped at $250,000.250 Damages are
240. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 227 (2011). For a detailed description of the history leading to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, see Nora
Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1655–58 (2015).
241. Wyeth, 562 U.S. at 227.
242. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34). The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Id.
243. Unless the petitioner seeks less than $1000, he or she may not sue a vaccine
administrator or manufacturer without first proceeding in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (West 2017). For a description of the history of
the Act, and its provisions, see Engstrom, supra note 240; Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the
Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785,
792–96 (2011).
244. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11(a)(1).
245. Id. § 300aa-14(a); 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2017).
246. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-11(c)(1), 300aa-13(a)(1)(A). The petitioner must prove
causation through conventional means in cases not covered by the Table. Meyers, supra note 243, at 790–91, 798, 801. The substantial majority of vaccine injury cases no
longer involve use of the Table. As a result, this litigation-shortening mechanism is
now largely inoperative.
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(ii).
248. Id. § 300aa-12(e)(2) (the court has 120 days from the date of filing of the response brief to complete its review).
249. Id. §§ 300aa-15(a)(1), (3).
250. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(4).
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also capped at $250,000 in cases of death.251 Attorneys’ fees are awarded in
cases in which the petitioner prevails and in cases in which he or she does not,
so long as the “petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable
basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.”252 Attorneys’ fees are
paid by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund.
The government or patient, rather than the vaccine manufacturer, pays an
excise tax on each vaccine to fund the Trust Fund, from which money is drawn
to pay damages, costs, and fees under the Act.253 The current excise tax is 75
cents per vaccine recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.254 To provide a sense of the scope of the program, from October 1,
1988, to March 1, 2017, 17,935 claims for compensation have been filed, of
which 5,269 were granted.255 Total outlays have been $3,619,323,678.256 Of
this total, $3,363,282,409 went to petitioners, and the balance of $256,041,269
was paid to attorneys.257
Under the Act, if claimants are dissatisfied with the results of their petitions before the Court of Federal Claims, they may elect to file a civil action
within 90 days.258 The scope of permissible civil actions against manufacturers
or health care providers is, however, quite narrow.259 The Act preempts certain
claims against providers and manufacturers, including those for design defect.260 Before the Bruesewitz decision in 2011, which further narrowed the
scope of available remedies for petitioners who opt out, 99.8% of petitioners
who received an award chose not to reject it in favor of a civil action.261
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program has been subject to
substantial criticism.262 Of greatest concern in this context is the failure of
petitions to be decided within the 240-day deadline set in the Act. In fact, fewer
than 5% of claims are decided timely, with an average resolution length of
more than 5 years.263 As time has passed, far fewer cases have been guided

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
Id. § 300aa-15(e).
See id. § 300aa-15(i)(2); see also Meyers, supra note 243, at 793.
26 U.S.C. § 4131(b)(1) (2012).
HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADM’R, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: MONTHLY STATISTICS REPORT
5 (updated Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/data/vicpmonthlyreporttemplate3_1_17.pdf.
256. Id. at 8–9.
257. Id.
258. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(a).
259. Id. §§ 300aa-22(b), (c).
260. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011). See also Engstrom,
supra note 240, at 1664.
261. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1664 n.186.
262. See generally id.; Meyers, supra note 243, at 792–809.
263. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1685.
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toward resolution by reference to the Table, requiring causation to be litigated.264 In addition, part of that delay is attributable to complexities in assessing damages, even though certain elements of damages are prescribed by
statute.265 The hope that such damage determinations could be made more cooperatively has collided with the default position in American litigation – adversarialism.266

B. The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.267 That Act created the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which was intended to provide monetary compensation to those physically injured in the attacks and to the families
of those killed.268 Congress intended that potential claimants either elect to
pursue no-fault compensation from the Fund, administered by a Special Master,269 or to pursue litigation through an exclusive federal remedy created in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.270 The Special Master was tasked with determining eligibility for compensation and the amount of
compensation awarded to those found eligible.271 The statute authorized the
Special Master to make individualized determinations of compensation, accounting for economic and noneconomic harm and deducting collateral source

264.
265.
266.
267.

Meyers, supra note 243, at 799–805.
Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1691–92.
Id. at 1664 n.186.
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). A key
purpose of the Act was to ensure the continued operation of the airlines in light of
concern that their insurance carriers might terminate coverage and insufficient funds
would be available in the capital markets to fund a potentially enormous liability. 147
CONG. REC. H5894–5902 (Sept. 21, 2001). Compensation for any suit filed against an
airline was capped at the amount of the airline’s insurance coverage. § 408(a), 115
Stat. at 240. That limitation was later extended to other potential defendants in litigation, such as airline security, the owners of the World Trade Center, and airport owners
and operators. Aviation Transportation and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201,
115 Stat. 646 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
268. § 403, 115 Stat. at 237–41.
269. Id. § 404. Filing a claim with the Special Master effects a waiver of rights to
pursue a judicial remedy. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). The Attorney General selected Kenneth Feinberg to serve as the Special Master. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, DEP’T OF JUST.,
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM
COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 6 (2004), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/September-11-Victim-Compensation-Fund-Final-ReportVolume-I-1.pdf.
270. § 408(b), 115 Stat. at 2401–41.
271. Id. § 405(b)(1).
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payments.272 The Special Master had 120 days after a claim was filed to make
such determinations, and those determinations were final.273
The statute therefore required the Special Master to make case-by-case
determinations based on traditional no-fault tort principles. At the same time,
pursuant to the statute’s directive that he also consider “the individual circumstances of the claimant,”274 the Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, included in
his consideration of individual circumstances “the financial needs or financial
resources of the claimant or the victim’s dependents and beneficiaries.”275
Nonetheless, Special Master Feinberg viewed his charge as not making
“widely disparate” awards to claimants.276 And the statute required those difficult determinations, and the resulting payments, to be made very quickly,
which dampened any inclination to make time consuming, highly individualized determinations.
For those killed in the attacks, Special Master Feinberg crafted “presumed” economic loss metrics for the calculation of lost future earnings intended to be both generous and easy to administer.277 The presumed noneconomic loss for those killed was set at a uniform $250,000, plus $100,000 for
the spouse and each dependent.278 The claimant could, however, attempt to
persuade the Special Master to depart from the presumed awards in cases of
“extraordinary circumstance.”279
With respect to economic loss in death cases, such extraordinary circumstances included an income exceeding the ninety-eighth percentile or a demonstration of greater-than-expected potential for job advancement.280 The regulations also permitted the Fund to enhance awards when the victim or victim’s
family “would suffer significant out-of-pocket expenses in order to maintain
daily care and household services.”281 The Fund’s final report stated that over
272. Id. §§ 405(b)(1)(B), (b)(6). The Act, then, contained provisions reflecting a
collective needs-based model (fault and contributory fault were irrelevant, with set-offs
for collateral sources) and a competing individual entitlements model (awarding compensation for economic and subjective noneconomic losses). Robert L. Rabin, September 11 Through the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464, 469–71
(2006) (reviewing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005)).
273. § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 239.
274. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
275. 28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2017).
276. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 5.
277. Id. at 7–9, 30–31; see 28 C.F.R. § 104.43. Additional economic losses included medical expenses, loss of services, and burial costs. Id. Special Master Feinberg described the methodology in a statement. DEP’T OF JUST., EXPLANATION OF
PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC LOSS (2002), www.justice.gov/archive/victimcompensation/vc_matrices.pdf.
278. 28 C.F.R. § 104.44.
279. Id. § 104.33(e)(2).
280. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 37–38.
281. Id. at 38.
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300 families demonstrated “extraordinary special needs, such as children suffering from serious medical conditions or developmentally disabled family
members who had depended on the victim’s assistance for daily care,”282 as
well as the loss of unborn children.
The presumed noneconomic loss award was also adjusted upward in extraordinary cases. Such cases included the loss of multiple family members in
the attacks, the death of other close family members shortly before or after
September 11, 2001, situations in which children lost both parents, circumstances in which an individual was severely injured and later died, cases of
pregnant victims, and instances when surviving spouses of deceased victims
miscarried due to trauma.283 Such increased awards were made in 75 cases.284
With respect to those injured in the attacks, Special Master Feinberg determined economic loss on a case-by-case basis, depending on the severity and
permanency of the injury.285 Given the wide variations in physical injuries,
Special Master Feinberg did not adopt a set non-economic injury award. Instead, he used the $250,000 figure in death cases as a guide and adjusted it
based on “the nature, severity and duration of the injury and the individual circumstances of the claimant.”286 In sum, one observer stated, “[T]he resultant
mix of presumptive scheduling tempered by personal empathy and pecuniary
adjustments at the margin was the touchstone to the success of the program.”287
Special Master Feinberg created 2 claims processing tracks once it was
determined that the written claim was substantially complete. Under Track A,
Fund evaluators issued decisions of eligibility and made a presumed eligibility
award.288 The claimant then had a right to appeal that award at an in-person
hearing, during which he or she could argue that “extraordinary circumstances”
warranted an upward adjustment to the presumed award.289 Under Track B, a
hearing before the Special Master or his designee was held after the claim was
found substantially complete.290 The award determination (if any) was made

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43.
28 C.F.R. § 104.45 (2017).
FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 43. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.46. The highest noneconomic award in an injury case was $6 million. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 43.
Four percent were greater than $250,000. Id. The Report identified those with catastrophic burns as those warranting high noneconomic compensation. Id.
287. Rabin, supra note 272, at 478.
288. Id. at 477 n.59.
289. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 15. See 28 C.F.R § 104.31(b)(2). The “extraordinary circumstances” standard for a departure from the presumed award is found at 28
C.F.R. § 104.33(f)(2).
290. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 15.
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thereafter without a right of appeal.291 In total, just over 3000 hearings were
held regarding award amounts for injury and death cases combined.292
Ninety-seven percent of eligible families of deceased and injured victims
obtained compensation through the Fund.293 Ninety-five lawsuits were filed
on behalf of 96 claimants in the Southern District of New York.294 Thirteen of
the cases (principally against airline carriers) settled quickly.295 Subsequent
delays and complications in discovery prompted Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein,
who oversaw the lawsuits, to assign a mediator to attempt to settle the remaining cases.296 Ultimately, all settled.297
Prior to the issuance of Judge Hellerstein’s Order and the Mediator’s Report, Professor Gillian K. Hadfield conducted an empirical study in which she
surveyed and interviewed claimants about their choice between seeking compensation from the Fund or pursuing federal litigation.298 Professor Hadfield
concluded that “the choice between accepting a payment from the Fund and
going to court was not exclusively, or even primarily, framed as a financial
calculation.”299 Although those who settled after pursuing litigation appeared
291. Id. According to the Report, claimants for deceased persons split fairly evenly
between choosing Track A or Track B. Id. at 16. Eighty-nine percent of injured claimants chose Track A. Id.
292. Id. at 18, 111. To put that in context, 2968 claims were filed for deceased
victims for which there were 2880 awards. Id. Nearly $6 billion, after offsets, were
awarded. Id. at 110. The average award was $2,082,035.07. Id. Further, 4435 claims
were filed for injured victims. Id. The Fund made 2680 awards, totaling just over $1
billion. Id. The average award was $392,968.11. Id.
293. Id. at 1.
294. In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 101, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2009) (order accepting mediator’s report and providing that it be filed).
295. Id. at 5.
296. Id. at 6–8.
297. Id. at 8 (at the time the report was issued, 3 cases remained unsettled). A
number of cases settled after damages-only discovery and jury trials in a sample of 6
cases. Id. at 7–8. See also Benjamin Weiser, Value of Suing over 9/11 Deaths Is Still
Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/nyregion/13lawsuits.html?_r=0. The last case settled in 2011. Benjamin Weiser, Family
and United Airlines Settle Last 9/11 Wrongful-Death Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/nyregion/last-911-wrongful-death-suit-issettled.html. The mediator assigned by Judge Hellerstein reported that the total amount
of settlements in the 93 cases was approximately $500 million, or roughly $5 million
per case. See In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 101, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 3, 2009) (report of the mediator on the mediation and settlement efforts of the
parties in the cases previously docketed under 21 MC 97). That compares to an average
award of just over $2 million in death cases made by the Fund. FEINBERG, supra note
269, at 1. The Mediator’s Report, however, cautions that such a comparison may be
misleading because some of the cases involved those with extremely high earnings or
other extraordinary circumstances. September 11 Litigation, slip op. at 13.
298. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008).
299. Id. at 647.
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to have recovered more than the average Fund recipient, obtaining that higher
amount was not, she concluded, an important reason for making that choice.300
Professor Hadfield’s surveys and interviews revealed that a substantial
number of respondents believed that parties other than the hijackers (such as
airline security firms, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service) deserved a measure of blame for the resulting
deaths and injuries.301 Ten of Professor Hadfield’s interviewees went the litigation route, and, she found, none did so for financial reasons.302 Instead, they
were motivated by a desire to punish, to achieve a public attribution of responsibility, to learn about what happened, to prevent a recurrence, or to avoid being
perceived as taking “hush money.”303 Some felt that litigation was part of responsible citizenship in which they acted “as an agent of the community to gain
information about what happened, to hold people accountable, and to play a
role in prompting responsive change.”304
Professor Hadfield found that 57% of the claimants who sought compensation through the Fund regarded that decision as “‘somewhat’ or ‘very’
hard.”305 Ten percent regretted their choice, and 25% were unsure about
whether they were right in choosing the Fund.306 Of those who found the decision difficult, non-monetary concerns substantially outweighed monetary
considerations in their thinking.307 Of those who did not, non-monetary considerations, such as financial pressure to obtain an award quickly and concerns
about the emotional stress of litigation, significantly outweighed monetary factors.308 Some did not believe that litigation would achieve the non-monetary
goals that litigants believed could be furthered.309

C. Transferrable Elements
Although done in different ways and with varying degrees of success, the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund both attempted to deal with the problem of compensating substantial numbers of persons for tragic injury in ways that strongly
steered claimants away from the traditional litigation model. They attempted
to tackle very different kinds of problems. The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was occasioned by a single horrendous event that summoned a
national will to compensate the victims of those attacks quickly, sensitively,
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id. at 653–59.
Id. at 660–61.
Id. at 659–62.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 664–70.
Id. at 666. In retrospect, that belief seems to have been borne out. All but 3
litigants settled without obtaining substantial discovery on liability. Id. at 675.
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and with meaningful, but not unbounded, generosity. The National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, in contrast, more closely resembles wrongful
conviction compensation, in the sense that it deals with the resolution of ongoing claims that will arise indefinitely.
The question of qualification for compensation was, in the vast majority
of cases, a non-issue in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund context. Use of the Vaccine Table was initially expected to make qualification
straightforward in vaccine injury cases as well, but it has not turned out that
way. Qualification decisions in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program follow a far more adversarial process as the Table has applied to fewer
and fewer cases. This has created significant delay in the resolution of vaccine
compensation qualification decisions.
On the compensation side, both programs incorporated varying concepts
of floors and caps, but they also created mechanisms for determining whether
appropriate compensation should exceed the floors or fall below those caps.
For the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, those mechanisms and
hard deadlines promised claimants a more efficient and shorter claims resolution process, with the Special Master as the ultimate decider. The Fund’s success was largely attributable to the Special Master’s efforts to create a nonadversarial process, administered by sensitive and empathetic staff, guided by
a claimant-centered mission. Compensation through the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, however, continues to be subject to the delay inherent in an adversarial process.
This brief comparison highlights the age-old conflicts in any claims resolution process. When qualification for compensation can be uncertain or debatable, individualized determinations are necessary. Those determinations
can follow from claimant-driven advocacy or an adversarial process. The time
required to make those decisions depends on the nature of that advocacy, the
volume of the claims, the complexity of the decision, and the number of decision-makers available. In the wrongful conviction compensation context, that
decision-making process ranges from an administrative claims process, in
which risk managers quickly decide written applications, to traditional adversarial litigation that, on occasion, reaches state supreme courts.
Uniform compensation may be efficiently and fairly determined when
claimants suffer identical injuries. However, when the compensatory determination may depend on individualized characteristics, a fact-finder informed
through an advocacy process must determine what characteristics are relevant,
whether they are present, and what weight they should be given; then, the factfinder must apply those determinations to the established compensatory metric.
The result may be comparatively fairer outcomes for claimants but ones that
may be obtained at some cost in time and money.
For at least some exonerees in certain states, the statutory process for receiving compensation for wrongful conviction combines the worst aspects of
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and the September 11th
Victim Compensation Program. For some listed on the Registry, the circum-
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stances of their exonerations nevertheless raise questions about their qualifications under state statutes. Those qualification determinations are often adversarial and delayed, particularly when the decision-maker is a busy judge rather
than a specialized administrative decision-maker. For those found qualified,
the resulting compensation decisions are, in most states, non-individualized but
nevertheless subject to delay. And, they are often both comparatively and normatively unjust due to prescribed awards and caps and the lack of an opportunity to seek exceptions for special individual circumstances. The task next,
then, is to draw upon the best features of these programs to craft a better compensation system for exonerees that is also mindful of the concerns of the
states.

VI. A PROPOSAL
As explained, there are three pieces to this puzzle. The first involves the
often lengthy and complex post-conviction procedure aimed at exoneration.
The second concerns the determination of whether the exoneree satisfies the
requirements of the state compensation statute. The third piece deals with the
award of state compensation to those qualified to receive it. At steps two and
three, an opportunity exists to construct a compensatory regime less adversarial, less time consuming, and more even-handed than most state statutes currently in place. That reconstruction should thoughtfully borrow from certain
statutory design elements of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, as well as sound
elements of certain existing state wrongful conviction compensation statutes.

A. A New Funding Mechanism
Paralleling the funding mechanism of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, states should create Wrongful Conviction Trust Funds.310
They should be funded with an initial lump sum deposit sufficient to cover
potential awards of current premature and pending claims. Going forward,
each state should make per-capita contributions based on the number of individuals committed to state incarceration each year, and they should account the
expected number of future eligible claimants and anticipated pay-outs, including the costs of social and other services awarded to the exoneree.
As described above, existing state data on annual incarcerations and data
from the National Registry of Exonerations offer state budgetary officials a
solid quantitative basis for determining an appropriate per-incarceration trust
fund deposit amount given the contours of the state compensation statute. That
amount can be adjusted over time if the number of qualified exonerees, number
310. Louisiana appears to be the only state with an explicit, statutorily created Innocence Compensation Fund dedicated to making awards under its state statute. The
Fund consists of appropriated funds, donations, grants, and “other monies which may
become available.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8.N(1) (West 2017).
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of state incarcerees, or the returns on the money in the trust deviate from expectation.311
This sort of pay-as-you-go approach to financing wrongful conviction
compensation trust funds may relieve states of the budgetary worry of rare but
unexpected and large payouts, which make low prescribed awards and caps
fiscally prudent but inadequately compensatory. On the expense side, as discussed below, states should be permitted (as many now are) to pay exonerees
in installments.312 A reasonably constant and predictable annual deposit to the
Trust Fund, and installment payments to exonerees from the Trust Fund, are
better and fairer ways of controlling the financial risks states now face than
prescribed awards and caps. That reduction of risk and uncertainty provides
states the breathing room necessary to increase the generosity of compensation
payments to qualified exonerees.
Moreover, a Trust Fund could also avoid delays inherent in states, like
California and Illinois, that require cumbersome legislative appropriation of
recommended awards.313 In those states, qualified exonerees risk being caught
in political budget battles. A particularly bitter one in Illinois has caused substantial delays in making payments authorized by the Illinois Court of
Claims.314 Of course, the annual appropriation to a state Trust Fund could suffer a similar fate, but the possibility of such difficulty could be factored into
earlier appropriation metrics to permit a cash cushion or partial payments. The

311. Taking Ohio again as an example, the average annual payout from 1989 to
2016 under existing law was just over $760,986 per year. In calendar year 2016, 19,895
persons were committed to Ohio prisons. CRAIG BERNIE, BUREAU OF RESEARCH &
EVALUATION, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION: CALENDAR
YEAR 2016 COMMITMENT REPORT 2 (2017), http://www.drc.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Reentry/Reports/Commitment%20Reports/CY2016%20COMMITMENT%20REPORT.pdf?ver=2017-03-10-103733-650.
A deposit in the trust fund of $38.25 per prisoner would approximate the amount required. In Ohio, as elsewhere, the numbers of persons imprisoned per year is dropping,
suggesting that increased deposits would be needed.
312. The Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, for example, prepares annual reports of disbursements from the Fund. See Innocence Compensation Program, LA. COMM’N ON L. ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. CRIM.
JUST., http://lcle.la.gov/programs/innocence_compensation.asp (last visited Mar. 14,
2017). It reports that, in nearly all cases, successful claimants are paid $25,000 per
year, rendering total annual payments relatively constant. LA. COMM’N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INNOCENCE COMPENSATION FUND
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016), http://www.lcle.la.gov/programs/uploads/2016_Innocence_Compensation_Fund_Report.pdf.
313. Similarly, in Alabama and Virginia, there is no entitlement to compensation.
Payment is contingent on legislative approval, which can be denied. ALA. CODE § 292-165 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(A) (West 2017). Even if the particular
awards do not require individual legislative approval, payments can be delayed by general state budgetary impasses. See Bowean, supra note 237.
314. Bowean, supra note 237.
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result, while perhaps not ideal, would be substantially better than the months
of delay experienced by qualified exonerees in Illinois.

B. Efficient Transition Between Exoneration and Compensation
It is striking, as Table 1 shows, that 576, or 38.17%, of exonerees in states
now with compensation statutes did not file a claim for state compensation. In
Part III.C, I offered a number of explanations for why a substantial number of
exonerees do not file state claims for compensation. The easiest fixes are to
eliminate unnecessary substantive disqualifiers, such as barring from compensation those exonerated on grounds other than DNA, those exonerated but not
receiving a pardon from the governor, those who pled guilty to the crime, or
those exonerees with prior felony convictions.
Procedure may explain other non-filings. The prototypical compensation
statute fundamentally involves two pieces of litigation: the post-conviction
criminal proceeding, resulting in relief under circumstances that may qualify
one for entry on the Registry, and a separate civil case in which the factual
basis for the exoneration must be reproved. A similar battle is fought twice,
and a state that concedes criminal relief may fight civil compensation.315 A
more seamless process would be one in which the court granting post-conviction relief on grounds of innocence, or grounds consistent with innocence,
would render findings of fact in a certificate of innocence that includes certain
recitals necessary for civil compensation. Such findings would automatically
be forwarded to and/or would be binding on the appropriate state civil compensation authority.
California, which historically has had a high non-filing rate, amended its
statute in 2014 along these lines for some cases.316 Generally, the award of a
declaration of factual innocence by a court or through the stipulation of a prosecutor obviates the need for a compensation hearing and is sufficient grounds
to recommend payment (which is statutorily prescribed in California) of a compensation claim.317 At least as to the category of California claims covered by
315. Jenifer McKim, Moral Debt: What Happens When the State Overturns a Conviction, but Fights the Payout, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2016, 2:32 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/moral-debt-what-happens-when-the-state-overturns-a-conviction-but-fights-the-payout_us_584edeb2e4b0e05aded4d371 (describing
the case of Kevin O’Loughlin).
316. California Improves Compensation Process for Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (May 19, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/may/19/california-improves-compensation-process-wrongfullyconvicted-prisoners/.
317. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.865 (West 2017). Similarly, if a court grants a writ
of habeas corpus, vacates a judgment of conviction, and finds that the petition unquestionably points to innocence, that finding is binding on the California Victim Compensation Board, the administrative body that adjudicates claims for compensation for
wrongful conviction. Id. § 1485.55(a). See also id. § 4902(a) (in such cases, the Board
will calculate the award within 30 days and recommend that the legislature pay it).
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this provision, one should expect 100% filing and, so long as the legislature
approves and appropriates the award, 100% grant rates.
In Illinois, those convicted of crimes they did not commit may file a state
court action in which they seek a certificate of innocence.318 If granted (there
appears to be only 2 of 107 claims denied in Illinois), the certificate is automatically transferred to the Illinois Court of Claims.319 As a matter of practice
after the Illinois statute was amended in 2008, those claims supported by a certificate of innocence are docketed and quickly approved for payment by the
court, without the need for further evidentiary presentation.320
Ohio takes a similarly proactive approach. When the trial court determines that an individual is wrongfully imprisoned, it notifies the clerk of the
Ohio Court of Claims within 7 days.321 Within 60 days of the trial court’s
determination, the Clerk of the Ohio Court of Claims requests that one-half of
the statutory amount be paid to the exoneree.322 If the individual fails to file a
claim for the balance with the Ohio Court of Claims within 6 months, the clerk
is directed to send periodic reminder letters thereafter.323
States without an automatic notification to the entity that awards claims
should provide exonerees with notice of the opportunity to file a claim with the
state. Texas’s notice statute is the best in the country in this regard. It requires
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to notify individuals determined to
be wrongfully imprisoned, both in writing and orally, of the right to make a
claim, with guidance on how to do it, and it recommends non-profit advocacy
groups that might provide assistance.324 The goal of these statutes is laudable
and should be replicated – to simplify and accelerate the procedural requirements of making claims and to reduce the incidence of procedural default.
Another way to reduce the rate of non-filing, particularly in states that
require claimants to seek compensation judicially rather than administratively,
Claims for compensation that do not rely on a declaration of factual innocence or such
a writ are decided by the Board following an evidentiary hearing. Id. § 4903(a). The
D.C. Mayor’s proposed amendment to the D.C. Act similarly requires a certificate of
innocence to be filed with an executive branch officer, the Chief Risk Officer, and implies that compensation would be paid upon receipt of additional documents required
in the proposed statute or by the Chief Risk Officer. FY 2018 Budget Support Act of
2017, B22-244, Subtit. C, § 1022.
318. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702(a) (West 2017).
319. Id. 5/2-702(h).
320. E-mail from Karen Daniel, Dir., Northwestern Law Sch. Ctr. on Wrongful
Convictions, to author (Dec. 7, 2016) (on file with author).
321. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(B)(3) (West 2017).
322. Id. § 2743.48(B)(4).
323. Id. § 2743.48(C)(2). Despite this statute, Ohio’s non-filing rate remains above
the national average.
324. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.102 (West 2017). Over half of
Texas’s non-filers were exonerated before the overhaul of the Texas compensation statute in 2009, which included this notice provision. See also IOWA CODE ANN. §§
663A.3, 663.A.4 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5577 (West 2017) (providing
notice).
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is to include an attorneys’ fees provision in the statute. From a compensatory
perspective, exonerees should be made whole to the extent possible, as the several states with fees provisions recognize. There is no need to go as far as the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act goes in awarding the losing claimant
attorneys’ fees. But, an attorneys’ fees provision may encourage attorneys to
represent claimants, especially those with potentially modest claims because
they were incarcerated relatively briefly. Florida has, as noted, an extremely
high non-filing rate, and its explicit bar on state payment of attorneys’ fees and
criminalization of private fee arrangements in these cases make a highly restrictive statute even worse.325
As suggested earlier, it is possible that other non-filers who were convicted in states that adopted compensation statutes after their exonerations either did not become aware of or were disqualified due to subsequent convictions or death. Additional states adopting compensation statutes should, as
many of the newer statutes do, provide prior state exonerees an opportunity to
seek compensation retroactively. The state should be able to identify such individuals, and most, or all, should be listed in the Registry. The state should
affirmatively notify the exoneree and his or her criminal defense attorney of
the right to seek compensation under the new statute.
In sum, states with high numbers of non-filers, particularly non-filers who
were incarcerated for a significant period of time, should revisit their statutes.
Table 1 helps identify such states, many of which appear not to have analyzed
their statutes from this perspective. That reexamination should assess whether
non-filing might be attributed to substantive statutory barriers and/or procedural issues. A number of states have, in contrast, taken steps to more seamlessly bridge the transition from exoneration to compensation. Those efforts
can fairly easily be replicated to reduce other states’ non-filing rates.

C. Permission to Pursue Other Claims
Recall that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund offered an
election of remedies on two levels. First, claimants could choose a remedy
through the Fund or proceed to litigation against private defendants in the
Southern District of New York, with a cap on damages corresponding to insurance coverage. Second, having chosen the Fund, the claimant could accept the
presumed award or seek to enhance it by showing “extraordinary circumstances,” thereby permitting an element of individualized determination.
Adapted to this context, that election of remedy should be modified in
one respect. Claimants who proceed under the state compensation statute
should not be precluded from seeking damages under tort or civil rights theories against other defendants, such as police officers, counties, or other municipalities.326 Of course, many exonerees will not file such suits because of the
325. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.056(5)(b) (West 2017); id. § 961.06(e).
326. Such is the case in several states. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-

103(9)(b) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(k) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS
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lack of evidence of misconduct, the presence of immunity defenses, the inability to find an attorney or to fund a lawsuit, or a preference to devote the time
and energy needed for litigation on other pursuits.
But for those with viable civil rights and tort claims, and the means and
inclination to pursue them, a non-preclusive statute would help relieve the evident anguish Professor Hadfield uncovered when September 11th claimants
were forced to elect between seeking compensation through the Fund or
through traditional litigation. Many struggled between accepting compensation and pursuing claims through litigation, as litigation might uncover facts
that could possibly assign blame or responsibility on accountable third parties.327 A majority resented that the Fund required a waiver of such claims in
exchange for compensation.328
In this context, preclusion could tend to drive most claimants to less generous, but more certain, no-fault state compensation and away from potentially
more generous, but less certain, civil rights and torts cases. That choice imposes real social costs. Civil rights and other suits can serve to identify rogue
officers, dishonest forensic examiners, or suspect investigative practices that
have led to wrongful convictions. Such lawsuits have led to additional exonerations and advances in investigative procedure, which will reduce wrongful
convictions in the future. Other than governmental repose, the only real justification supporting preclusion is to avoid duplicative recovery, and that problem can, as discussed below, be dealt with through offsetting.

D. Election of State Remedies
Similar to the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, but absent
from all current state compensation statutes, the statute itself should offer a
choice. In Option A, states should create generous, but fiscally measurable,329
ANN. § 691.1755(8) (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4608 (West 2017) (may
make other claims against parties other than the state). A number of states, however,
explicitly preclude, in whole or in part, those seeking or receiving state statutory awards
from seeking alternative remedies for wrongful conviction. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(g) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 961.06(5), (6)(a) (application for compensation under state statute requires a release of all claims arising from
wrongful conviction; claimant may not apply for compensation if there is a pending
lawsuit); IOWA CODE ANN. § 669.10; MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(4) (West 2017)
(claimant receiving award under statute may not obtain award under Mississippi Tort
Claims Act); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.12(B) (West 2017) (same); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.100.080(1) (West 2017) (claimant waives relief against state, subdivision, or
employees under any legal theory arising from wrongful conviction).
327. See Hadfield, supra note 298, at 646–49.
328. Id. at 668.
329. In Massachusetts, the total package of services and monetary compensation
cannot exceed $500,000, demonstrating that the monetary value of non-monetary redress is ascertainable. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(a) (West 2017). The
potential costs of these items can be factored into the state’s calculation of an appropriate per-capita deposit into the state’s Wrongful Conviction Compensation Trust Fund.
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compensation packages, from which claimants can select elements that are
suited to their needs. The remedial packages should permit an exonerated person, after consultation with a state-designated reentry specialist or a professional of his or her own choosing, to select among an a la carte menu of remedial options. Alternatively, in Option B, exonerated claimants should be permitted to sue the state. That option would look much like the D.C. Act, in
which liability is no-fault and compensation is uncapped and tort-based.
Recall the respective backgrounds of Kirk Odom and Donald Gates. Mr.
Odom was exonerated nearly a decade after his release from prison; he had
married, started a small business, qualified for medical insurance, and rented
an affordable apartment with his family. Mr. Gates was exonerated and released simultaneously after being incarcerated for over 27 years; he had no
resources for housing, transportation, or a host of other urgent personal needs.
Based on their personal circumstances, preferences, and inclinations, exonerees like them should be permitted to choose between a prescribed basket
of compensation and support options and a traditional uncapped litigation option. The former should include:
1. Transitional housing for an appropriate period of time and assistance
accessing mortgage financing for a home thereafter;
2. State-provided medical and dental insurance to cover treatment
and therapy for conditions causally connected to their incarceration
for an appropriate period of time;
3. Vocational and employment training services;
4. Time-limited transportation vouchers;
5. Expedited provision of state-issued identification cards;
6. Tuition benefits at public universities or state educational institutions;
7. Tuition benefits for children born prior to or during the wrongful
incarceration at public universities or other state educational institu330
tions;

330. Only Colorado currently provides tuition benefits for the children of the exonerated, provided the children were conceived or adopted prior to the incarceration and
the exonerated parent was incarcerated for at least 3 years. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-65-103(2)(E)(II).
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8. State payment of child support arrearages accrued during the period
331
of incarceration;
9. Low-interest state loans through existing state programs to begin a
332
small business or a non-profit organization;
10. Other services demonstrated by the claimant to be necessary to fa333
cilitate his or her particular reentry into the community;
11. Reimbursement for costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and expenses
associated with criminal defense and post-conviction relief;
12. Reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in advancing the civil claim;
13. Recovery of lost wages and other economic losses;
14. Expungement of the wrongful conviction;

334

15. An immediate bridge payment to reentering exonerees for adequate
living expenses until the full package is received;
335

16. A non-taxable, pro-rata presumed, non-economic damage award
of $200,000 per year of incarceration, doubled for time served on death
row, and adjusted for inflation; and

331. Only Colorado and Texas provide for payment of child support arrearages. Id.
§ 13-65-103(2)(E)(III); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.051(a)(6) (West
2017).
332. No state presently offers such loans. The exonerated, however, are, either because of their record (if not expunged), or because of a period of unemployment, frozen
out of the credit market. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, Making Up for Lost Time, supra
note 13, at 17. States paying claimants on an installment basis might consider periodic
loan repayments coming out of those installments.
333. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e) (West 2017).
334. The statutes of several states – Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and Washington – provide for expungement or sealing. See
Jack Healy, Wrongfully Convicted Often Find Their Record, Unexpunged, Haunts
Them, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (May 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/us/wrongfullyconvicted-find-their-record-haunts-them.html.
335. The statutes of California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Jersey, Vermont, and Washington explicitly state that the award to the plaintiff (except,
for some, any award of attorneys’ fees) is not taxable. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-65-103(6)(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-3(g) (West 2017); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(d) (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(3)(b) (West
2017). Wrongful conviction awards are not taxable by the federal government. 26
U.S.C.A. 139F (West 2017).
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17. A presumed non-economic damage award of $75,000 per year for
time served post-release on probation, on parole, and/or as a registered
336
sex offender.

Most of these items are already part of at least one state’s statute, but no
state offers such a comprehensive set of services and remedies. Moreover,
many states make some of this support available to reentering citizens on parole
or probation but disqualify the exonerated from receiving them because they
are no longer supervised by the state.337 A number of states have recognized
what should be obvious – that for some exonerees, the successful reintegration
into society will require the prompt and efficient provision of the kinds of social services commonly viewed as part of a humane social safety net.338
Particularly for those exonerated and released from incarceration at the
same time, transitional housing, access to public transportation, and state-issued identification are immediately essential. There is very commonly a need
for prompt and ongoing medical, dental, and psychological treatment for conditions caused by the wrongful conviction. Less urgent, but crucial in the shortterm, are vocational training, job placement, and educational support to assist
the exonerated in reentering the workforce. Entry into the job market is often
made more difficult with a criminal record, making expungement of the wrongful conviction necessary.
It makes no sense for states to provide reentry support and services to
those who were correctly convicted and released from custody but to deny them
to the wrongly convicted. States owe the innocent more, not less, than the
guilty. That obligation should extend to those forms of relief which, in the
view of the exoneree and reentry specialist, will best put that person on the path
to restoring the life he or she might have had. Depending on the length of the
incarceration and the nature of the harm experienced while in custody, the cost
of doing so will be greater for some exonerees than others.
States can, however, be creative in controlling those costs in a manner
that is both fiscally responsible and mindful of the restorative purpose of these
efforts. For example, states might reasonably require individuals to be incarcerated for a certain period of time before they are eligible for certain forms of

336. To prevent the premature depletion of this money, state law should require at
least half of these damage awards to be invested in annuities offered by safe and established life insurance companies.
337. Evan J. Mandery et al., Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 578 (2013).
338. Surveys of the exonerated show that significant numbers suffer from mental
health conditions, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression and
are financially dependent on others. Heather Weigand, Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and Exonerated, 18 PUB. INT. L.J. 427, 428 (2009) (summarizing results
of a survey of 60 exonerees by The Life After Exoneration Program).
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relief.339 Of the 1900 individuals convicted in state courts on the Registry of
Exonerations as of March 1, 2017, 474 served 2 or fewer years in prison.340
States might determine that persons who were wrongfully incarcerated comparatively briefly do not merit, for example, tuition benefits and housing assistance. In addition, so long as the caps are adequate to provide meaningful support and services, and an opportunity exists to petition for additional assistance
in cases of demonstrated need, states could consider capping the costs of particular services or particular combinations of services, as Minnesota has
done.341
At the same time, wrongful conviction can be financially costly. Some
of the exonerated have paid court costs, criminal penalties, and attorneys’ fees
associated with their wrongful conviction and post-conviction proceedings.
Those should be reimbursed. Some may leave prison with substantial unpaid
child support arrearages. And, as is the case with the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, make-whole relief requires that the state pay the attorneys’ fees for reasonable time devoted to representing the exonerated in seeking that civil redress.342
Last, those exonerees who were incarcerated long-term, in particular,
have been deprived of the opportunity to make a legacy. For many families,
that involves assisting a child in going college. For others, it may be the purchase of a home or creation of a small business. The opportunity for a legacy
should be restored to the exonerated. Offering children of the exonerated an
opportunity to go to state colleges or universities has little marginal cost for the
state and potentially high benefit for the children and their families. If a viable
business plan is presented, states should provide the exonerated with low-income loans, in connection with existing small business development programs.
The lack of a credit history may similarly require the state to assist the exoneree
in obtaining a mortgage to purchase a home, perhaps payable from annual compensation payments.
In short, should the exoneree elect Option A, the determination of what
combination of support and services would best serve his or her needs should
be the product of a collaborative and ongoing relationship between the state
and the exoneree and counsel. That relationship will, it is hoped, increase the
likelihood of a successful reentry and meaningfully satisfy the state’s moral
obligation to help those it has so grievously harmed.

339. Colorado’s tuition waiver for the exonerated and custodial children, for example, applies only if the wrongful incarceration was for at least 3 years. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(E)(II)(B).
340. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.
341. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365 subdiv. 3 (West 2017).
342. Although the provisions vary, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin permit the recovery of attorneys’ fees to some degree from the state.
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E. The Annual Award
Of these proposals, the one likely to be the most controversial is the
$200,000 per-year award.343 It should not be. Table 1 shows that the current
average annual payment per incarcerated exoneree in states with statutes is just
under $27,000 per year of incarceration and just over $23,700 nationally.344 To
be sure, that number will creep upwards if currently pending cases are decided
in the exoneree’s favor. There are, however, only 65 pending cases. And, that
number will increase as cases now coded as “premature” are filed and awards
are made. However, a substantial number of those are brief incarcerations for
Texas drug possession convictions. Even if those numbers increase, they will
not likely exceed lost wages for a fairly low wage worker. That means, on
average, there is effectively no compensation for the extraordinary non-economic harms suffered by the wrongly convicted. No fair-minded person would
argue that the wrongly convicted are entitled to no damages for their loss of
liberty.
Not only are these figures discouragingly low, but they stand in striking
contrast to awards in recent judgments in state compensation cases without
caps and federal civil rights cases arising from wrongful conviction. Placed in
that context, $200,000 per year is half of that awarded to Mr. Tribble and onefifth of that provided to Mr. Newton, whose $1 million per year of incarceration
now stands at the higher range of such awards.345
Let’s put this proposal in broader context. If the next 2000 exonerees
placed on the Registry also average 8.7 years lost to wrongful conviction (as
the last 2000 have), the total cost, at $200,000 per year, would be
$3,480,000,000. That figure is slightly less than the $3,619,000,000 paid by
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Fund since 1989346 and less than
half of the approximately $7 billion paid by the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.347 Even if it took 20 years to arrive at the next 2000 exonerees,
rather than the 28 years it took for first 2000, the cost would be $174,000,000
annually, or about $3.5 million per year for each of the 50 states.348
343. After I developed this proposal, the D.C. Mayor’s budget bill proposed a
$200,000 per-year compensation metric. FY 2018 Budget Support Act of 2017, B22244, Subtit. C, § 1022. See also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
344. See infra Table 1.
345. Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super.
LEXIS 4, at *81 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); Newton v. City of New York, No. 07
Civ. 6211, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34594, *177 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2016).
346. See supra Part V.A.
347. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 98–99 (nearly $6 billion paid in claims for deceased victims and $1.05 billion paid for physical injury victims).
348. According to the Registry, the average number of years lost to wrongful incarceration by the first 2000 exonerees wrongly convicted in both state and federal court
is 8.7 years. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. Admittedly, I have excluded
the additional compensation for post-release time or parole, probation, or as a registered
sex offender and for reimbursements and services provided by the states.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

63

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

432

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

In reality, the actual amount is likely to be considerably less. Some states
will continue not to have compensation statutes. There will continue to be
some, but hopefully less, non-filing. Some claims will continue to be denied.
If additional states require the exonerated to repay compensation received from
the state from amounts received in federal civil rights settlements or judgments,
the price tag is further reduced. All told, when viewed from this broader perspective, the need for enhanced awards is clearer, and the costs of them are
surprisingly modest.
My case-by-case review of awards in state statutory compensation cases
reveals another profoundly unsettling aspect of these awards. There is extraordinary variation in compensation, with many exonerees receiving nothing,
while others receive sizeable awards. To be sure, variation is not uncommon
in tort law, but unlike tort law, the primary compensatory metric used by most
states is a standard multiplication problem – dollars per years served. The considerable differences among states in assigning a dollar-per-year value results,
as shown earlier, in vastly different values placed on a year of lost liberty depending on the state of conviction. Connecticut values that year 165 times
greater than Wisconsin. No fair compensatory system would have such a result. While a purpose of this Article is to encourage individual states to reexamine their statutes, this extraordinary variation suggests that a national review
is in order and should have as a primary goal reducing this unsettling inequality.
It is true that these preliminary calculations exclude the costs of the proposed social and other services. Costs will also increase to the extent that exonerees select the unbounded litigation option, Option B, and win more than
the $200,000-per-year threshold. However, if states adopt this proposed election of remedy framework, they will have some interest in steering claimants
into Option A. The judge overseeing and the Special Master administering the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund applied some pressure on applicants to seek compensation through the Fund.349 They were very successful in
achieving that goal, with 97% doing so.350 That task was made easier because
Special Master Feinberg and his team made the Fund an appealing option by
using flexible and informal procedures, an expedited resolution process, and
reasonably generous and administratively efficient compensation metrics.351
States would be well-advised to pursue the same approach and make Option A
substantively and procedurally attractive.

F. Avoidance of Lump Sum Payments and Offset
Implicit in many state compensation statutes is the worry that newly freed,
wrongfully convicted individuals may spend a large amount of money un-

349. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 1.
350. Id. at 75.
351. Id. at 1, 81.
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wisely. Only Colorado requires the awardee to take a personal financial management course,352 but many other states permit or require the compensation to
be paid to an annuity company or directly to the exoneree in installments.353
Acceptance of installment payments is a reasonable exchange for enhanced generosity. Such payments enforce, albeit paternalistically, a measure
of spending discipline while regularizing state payments from their Trust
Funds. Provisions, however, should be made for an opportunity to request and
receive a lump sum or larger installment payments in compelling situations.354
Offsets are another reasonable price to be paid to encourage states to enact
more progressive compensation statutes. In the District of Columbia, courts
have ruled that the state compensation award is not offset by any settlement
reached in claims against the federal government.355 In New York, two recent
federal courts have similarly ruled that civil rights awards should not be offset

352. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(F) (West 2017) (exoneree must complete a financial management course to receive more than one annual payment).
353. ALA. CODE § 29-2-160(a) (2017) (may pay in installments); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3-114(1)(a) (annual payments of $100,000 adjusted for inflation); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 961.06(4) (West 2017) (annuity for entire amount awarded); LA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15-572.8(H)(2), (O) (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10501(c) (West 2017) (lump sum or installments); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, §
5(A) (West 2017) (lump sum or annuity installments); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
691.1755(6) (West 2017) (lump sum or installment); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(a)
(West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.058.1(4) (West 2017) (no award of more than
$36,500 per year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(a)(2) (West 2017) (court may order annuity if damages exceed $1 million); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (West 2017)
(monthly installments unless lump sum award is warranted; lump sum may be funded
by annuity); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053(a) (West 2017) (claimant
entitled to annuity); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405(2)(d) (West 2017) (allocations
made so that the amount is paid within 10 years); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(B)
(West 2017) (lump sum of 20%; remainder by annuity); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.100.060(11) (West 2017) (claimant or attorney general may initiate and agree to a
structured settlement).
354. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(D) (claimant can seek lump sum payment upon showing of special needs; Board will consider if lump sum is in the best
interests of the person and whether he or she can wisely manage and control the payment). Motivated by a desire to help an exoneree purchase a home, the Colorado legislature recently passed Senate Bill 17-125, which permits exonerees to elect to receive
the balance of the award in a lump sum if certain conditions are met. S. 17-125, 71st
Gen Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (allowing certain persons who have been
exonerated of crimes to receive in lump sum payments compensation that is owed to
them by the state).
355. The D.C. Superior Court in both Odom and Tribble held that prior settlements
with the federal government could not be offset against state awards because the City
Council expressed in the legislative history that the remedies be cumulative. Tribble v.
District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *24–25
(D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239,
2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *57–58 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015).
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by earlier state compensation settlements.356 Other states, however, make the
offset requirement explicit. Colorado, for example, requires state compensation recipients to repay the state amounts received in subsequent cases arising
from the wrongful conviction.357
If, as I propose, exonerees are permitted to pursue both state compensation and other remedies, then it is not unfair to impose an offset, whereby the
state compensation is repaid in whole or in part by a subsequent civil rights or
tort award. The latter sort of offset could significantly reduce state payouts in
these kinds of cases.

G. Procedural Efficiency and Expedition
Should the qualified exonerated claimant358 wish to select Option A, he
or she would apply to the director of the state Trust Fund for that remedial
package. Selected remedial items should be promptly provided by a date set
by statute. If the state imposes a prescribed amount or if the claimant selects
one, there is no reason why such an administrative entity cannot quickly award
it. Texas offers a sound approach to expediency. There, a claimant files an
application with the judiciary section of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.359 The Comptroller is required to make a determination of eligibility
and compensation within 45 days.360 If granted, the compensation is paid

356. Federal courts in New York have held that, under New York law, New York
state compensation settlements should not be offset from subsequent civil rights
awards. Peacock v. City of Rochester, No. 6:13-cv-6046-MAT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103544, at *16–19 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016); Restivo v. Nassau Co., Civ. No. 06-cv6720, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188474, at *23–29 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2014). The rationale of those decisions was that the state and county actors were not joint tortfeasors
and that the state share of liability in § 1983 actions was zero. Restivo, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 188474, at *28–29; Peacock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *19. Nor was
there a double recovery because the rule against double recovery applies only to judgment, not settlements. Restivo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188474, at *10; Peacock, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *19.
357. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-114(6), (7); 13-65-103(8)(a) (offsets
award under statute by recovery in another civil action against the state or other governmental entity arising from the wrongful conviction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365,
subdiv. 5 (West 2017) (future damages resulting from action by claimant against state
or political subdivision are offset by award under state statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:4C-2(b) (award of damages against state, subdivision, or employee are offset by
award under Act).
358. Those in receipt of a certificate of innocence or similar document with statutorily required recitals should be deemed automatically qualified. See ALA. CODE § 292-165(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.368; VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(A).
359. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.051(a) (West 2017).
360. Id. § 103.051(c).
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within 30 days.361 Unlike some state statutes with deadlines, Texas wisely imposes deadlines on an Executive Branch administrator to decide the merits of
the claim and to make the award.362 For those selecting the remedial package,
remedies selected should be provided separately. A calculation of lost wages,
for example, may require a presentation by an economic expert and may take
some time. That showing should not delay the provision of other needed financial support and social services.363
That is not to say, however, that the award package can escape all controversy. It is easy to foresee disputes over the appropriate lost wage calculation.
One can also imagine situations in which there is dispute as to whether the
exoneree needs or would benefit from particular services. Is transitional housing needed if the exoneree is living with family members? Is a college tuition
voucher useful for someone with significant educational or cognitive issues?
When is a proposal for a low-interest state loan sufficiently viable to warrant
the loan? There is evidence of even low-level compensatory disputes in the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program that have introduced delay
and adversarialism in that process.364 Why would this be any different when,
for instance, a state reentry specialist and a social worker of the exoneree’s
choosing disagree on the elements of the basket of supports and services appropriate for a qualified exoneree?
There is no reason to create a mechanism for solving a problem that may
not exist. A number of states offer particular supports and services. It is not at
all clear that these kinds of disputes have in fact materialized in these cases. If
they do, however, it should be possible to appoint a judge to promptly adjudicate them without the possibility of appeal and without delaying receipt of the
services about which there is no dispute.365
Critics might point to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
as an example of one program in which statutory deadlines are routinely
missed, casting doubt on whether they could be met here. One important difference is that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is a national

361. Id. § 103.051(a).
362. Id. §§ 103.051(a), (c).
363. Ohio and Utah take unusually proactive approaches to the issue of prompt pay-

ment. In Ohio, within 60 days of a judicial determination of wrongful imprisonment,
the court of claims will request payment of a preliminary judgment of half of the
amount expected to be paid. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48B(B)(3) (West 2017).
Utah will pay 20% of the payment owed or 2 years’ worth of incarceration, whichever
is higher, within 45 days of a court determination of actual innocence. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-9-405(2)(a) (West 2017). Texas and Virginia offer interim awards, but
there is no deadline for their payment. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.102(b)(3) (West
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(C).
364. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1692.
365. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-101(7) (West 2017) (if the claimant appeals a jury award, the court may direct the state administrator to pay the petitioner
pending appeal).
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program with a single point of entry. In fiscal year 2016, 1120 claims for compensation were filed.366 In this context, claims would be filed in states with
statutes, and the volume per state would be dramatically less. That reduces the
possibility of delay due to high volume. That lower state volume may make
easier enforcement of tight statutory deadlines.

H. The Unbounded Litigation Option
The qualified exoneree should not, however, be required to select the remedial package. Some claimants may not regard the package of services and
reimbursements to be particularly useful and, like some applicants seeking
compensation through the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, may
believe that their particular circumstances warrant a departure upward from the
presumptive $200,000-per-year value. They may believe, for example, that a
serious illness or injury and a resulting diminished life expectancy are causally
related to their wrongful incarceration and seek additional compensation for
that particular loss.
For compensatory or other reasons, they may wish for an opportunity to
express publicly the depth of their suffering or, if regarded as relevant by the
state,367 to use this litigation to expose evidence of misconduct. They should
be permitted to do so in an expedited procedure before a state judge, sitting
with or without a jury, selected by the chief justice of the state supreme court.368
That process will be lengthier, involving traditional civil discovery and expert
witnesses. There should be no cap, and reasonable attorneys’ fees at prevailing
market rates in the state should be awarded to prevailing claimants.
No state currently offers this kind of election of remedy. The wrongly
convicted were, during their incarceration, largely denied the freedom to
choose. There is something particularly appropriate about permitting qualified
exonerees an opportunity, with counsel, to consider their individual circumstances and to choose the remedial option that best suits their needs and preferences. Choice, even if necessarily limited, navigates a path between a prescribed and capped award, which ignores individual circumstances, and the sort
of adversarial litigation Kirk Odom and Santae Tribble experienced. Choice,
which allows for the collaboration between reentry specialists, attorneys as
counselors, and other professionals to assist in the decision-making, may help
at least some of the exonerated obtain what they need to rebuild their lives.
366. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADM’R, supra note 255, at 6.
367. Connecticut appears to be the only state that explicitly accounts for the negli-

gence or misconduct of governmental agents in assessing the amount of compensation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(d) (West 2017). Claims Commissioner decisions
in 4 cases supplemented the award based on this factor. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 258D, § 5 (West 2017) (court may consider “particular circumstances of . . . trial
and other proceedings”).
368. In Minnesota, the chief justice appoints a compensation panel of 3 attorneys
or judges to determine the amount of damages to be awarded. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611.363 subdiv. 1 (West 2017).
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And, choice helps states better discharge their moral obligations which underscore these statutes. To be sure, states may, like Special Master Feinberg, ease
that choice by making the collaborative option extremely attractive to exonerees through generosity, flexibility, and efficiency. That would not be a
bad outcome.

VII. CONCLUSION
Most fair-minded people would be outraged if the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund precluded certain victims who resided in certain states
from seeking compensation; if 38% of the potentially eligible did not apply at
all; if only 44% of the victims were compensated; if those compensated for
similar injuries were awarded widely varying amounts based on random fortuity like state residence; if the average compensatory amount were many times
smaller than that typically awarded in similar cases; or if it sometimes took
years to receive an award. We would regard such a compensatory regime as
grossly unfair. Yet that is precisely the state of statutory wrongful conviction
compensation in the United States today.
The problem is not the lack of public recognition of wrongful convictions.
They are widely reported in the press, on social media, and by advocacy
groups; podcasts are now devoted to the subject. Nor is the problem a lack of
understanding of the horror of wrongful conviction. The New York State Law
Revision Commission, which recommended New York’s wrongful conviction
compensation statute, claimed that wrongful incarceration is “the most serious
deprivation of individual liberty that a society may impose.”369 Many states,
however, simply have not caught up with Professor Borchard’s vision of decades ago, much less today’s understanding that grievous errors occur in the
criminal justice system, and that innocent people are profoundly harmed as a
result. While it is difficult to view Kirk Odom and Santae Tribble as men
blessed by good fortune, they were lucky to have been wrongly convicted in
the District of Columbia and fairly compensated as a result. The vast majority
of exonerees are not so fortunate.
Appealing to the moral sensibilities of state legislatures has, to a very real
degree, helped make progress in several states. The empirical research presented here may, it is hoped, provide the basis for an economic argument that
most states can compensate exonerees more generously and more equitably.
Highlighting those states with creative approaches to serving the very real medical, vocational, and social service needs of exonerees may encourage states
that have not revisited their statutes in many years to incorporate similar concepts.

369. Baba-Ali v. State, 878 N.Y.S.2d 555, 587–88 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2009) (quoting
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR ON
REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY
IMPRISONED, 1984 McKinney’s Laws of New York 2899, 2903)).
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Recent scholarship focuses on another benefit. A recent study of 118 exonerees from Florida, Illinois, Texas, and New York, 71 of whom received
some compensation, examined the amounts received and the rates at which exonerees committed post-exoneration offenses.370 The authors found that “[t]he
mean amount of compensation for those with no post-exoneration offense was
$1.7 million, as compared to $720,000 for those who had at least one postexoneration offense.”371 In addition, the researchers concluded that those who
received more than $500,000, including those with a previous history of criminal behavior, were significantly less likely to offend post-release.372 The researchers believed that the need for a threshold level of support to surmount
known barriers to reentry and the fostering of positive feelings toward a justice
system that once failed them may explain the link between more generous compensation and lower recidivism.373 Perhaps additional scholarship will focus
on the benefits of social services to reduce recidivism as well.
The path forward requires recognition of the progress made, particularly
by a few states, such as Minnesota, Colorado, Washington, Texas, and Alabama, that have at least in part broken the mold of the standard state compensation statute. But, it also requires a forthright acknowledgement that, with the
exception of Texas, the states with these better compensation statutes have,
ironically, relatively few potential beneficiaries of them. That is why it is important to candidly recognize state fiscal concerns and to develop concrete
ideas to respond to them, such as the creation of Wrongful Conviction Trust
Funds, installment payments, offsets, and sensible limits on certain services for
those wrongly incarcerated for relatively brief periods.
As important, the exonerated are better served by moving from a depersonalized compensation regime to one that offers an election of remedy that
permits them, to some degree, to select a remedial path better suited for their
personal needs and circumstances. I cannot say that I know which path my
clients might have taken if offered that choice in the D.C. Act. But, I can say
that it could be appealing to forego litigation and a potentially sizeable recovery
in exchange for an expedited, less adversarial, and more holistic approach that,
at least for some of the exonerated, may better remedy the profound harm they
have suffered.

370.
371.
372.
373.

Mandery et al., supra note 337, at 571.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 576.
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